Federal Jurisdiction by Chang, Williamson B.C.
Golden Gate University Law Review
Volume 16




Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev
Part of the Other Law Commons
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Academic Journals at GGU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Golden Gate University Law Review by an authorized administrator of GGU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
jfischer@ggu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Williamson B.C. Chang, Federal Jurisdiction, 16 Golden Gate U. L. Rev. (1986).
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol16/iss1/11
FEDERAL JURISDICTION 
MISSING THE BOAT: THE NINTH CIRCUIT, 
HAWAIIAN WATER RIGHTS AND THE 
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF RETROACTIVE 
OVERRULING 
WILLIAMSON B.c. CHANG* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Unquestionably, the Ninth Circuit panel in Robinson v. 
Ariyoshi1 agonized over the final result. The appeal from the 
district court was filed in 1977. The Ninth Circuit issued its de-
cision affirming the lower court opinion in 1985. Between these 
two dates, the Ninth Circuit convened two panels to hear the 
case, held three different hearings and even certified questions 
of state law to the Hawaii Supreme Court. The issue that made 
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Hawaii, A.B. Princeton University, 1972; 
J.D. Boalt Hall School of Law, University of California, Berkeley, 1975. Member Califor-
nia and Hawaii Bars. The author was a special deputy attorney general representing the 
Chief Justice of the Hawaii Supreme Court in the case discussed in this article, Robinson 
v. Ariyoshi, 753 F.2d 1468 (9th Cir. 1985) petition for cert. filed, 54 U.S.L.W. 3279 (U.S. 
Sept. 10, 1985) (No. 85-406), and filed an amicus curiae brief on behalf of the Chief 
Justice and participated in two of the oral arguments before the Ninth Circuit. The au-
thor is no longer participating in the case and wishes to emphasize that the views ex-
pressed in this article are solely his own and do not represent the opinions of any agency 
with which he may be associated. The author would like to thank Jason Yoshida, third-
year law student at the University of Hawaii School of Law, for his assistance on this 
article. The author also wishes to acknowledge the assistance, financial and otherwise, of 
the Water Resources Research Center of the University of Hawaii, which has made pos-
sible my research in the area of Hawaiian water rights. A shorter version of this article 
appeared first in the Winter 1986 issue of the Western Natural Resource Litigation Di-
gest, which has subsequently ceased publication. 
1. 753 F.2d 1468 (9th Cir. 1985), petition for cert. filed, 54 U.S.L.W. 3279 (U.S. 
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this case so difficult was not that the case related to Hawaiian 
water rights, but rather that it focused on the constitutionality 
of retroactive changes in the law-an issue that has also sur-
faced recently in California cases involving the public trust doc-
trine.2 In Robinson v. Ariyoshi, the Ninth Circuit upheld the ac-
tion of the lower federal courtS in voiding a state supreme court 
decision that allegedly had overruled earlier precedents. Prior to 
the district court's injunction, the decision of the Hawaii Su-
preme Court in McBryde v. Robinson;' had been appealed to the 
United States Supreme Court and certiorari had been denied. II 
The retroactive overruling of prior decisions, and the pro-
cess of judicial change in general, has always been a difficult 
phenomena for courts to explain. The conventional Blackstonian 
explanation must seem nonsensical to the non-lawyer. The law 
was viewed as a "brooding omnipresence" in the sky.6 The judge 
simply recorded what he saw. The fact that a decision might be 
overruled was explained on the basis that later judges had a 
clearer, more accurate view of the law. Thus, it was not the law 
that had changed, but rather the "clouds" or whatever obscured 
the judicial vision which had changed. This Blackstonian view of 
the law preserves the fiction that the judge has no active role in 
shaping the law. He does not make law. He declares what law 
is.'1 However patently transparent this explanation may seem, it 
is nevertheless a necessary premise of contemporary thinking. 
Any other explanation brings one to the conclusion that it is the 
judge who changes the law. If judges change law, however, they 
inevitably must be said to create and destroy property rights. 
Arguably, as asserted in Robinson v. Ariyoshi, such action is the 
equivalent of a taking that requires just compensation. 
The Ninth Circuit confronted these issues in Robinson v. 
2. See, e.g., National Audubon Soc'y v. Superior Court, 33 Cal. 3d 419, 658 P.2d 709, 
189 Cal. Rptr. 346, cert. denied, 466 U.S. 977 (1983); City of Berkeley v. Superior Court, 
26 Cal. 3d 515, 606 P.2d 362, 162 Cal. Rptr. 327, cert. denied, 449 U.S. 840 (1980). 
3. 441 F. Supp. 559 (D. Hawaii 1977). 
4. 54 Hawaii 174, 504 P.2d 1330 (1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 976, cert. denied and 
appeal dismissed sub nom. McBryde Sugar Co. v. Hawaii, 417 U.S. 962 (1974). 
5. 417 U.S. 962 (1974). 
6. This is Holmes' sarcastic phrase. Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 
222 (1916) (Holmes, J., dissenting). See generally, Levy, Realist Jurisprudence and Pro-
spective Overruling, 109 U. PA. L. REV. I, 2 (1960). 
7. [d. 
2
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Ariyoshi, a case that has wide ranging implications concerning 
the relationship between federal and state courts.8 However, the 
rationale and reasoning of the Ninth Circuit misses the boat. 
The result reached by the court threatens to subordinate state 
supreme courts to the powers of federal district courts in areas 
of traditional state law concern.9 
This article is divided into five parts. The Background sec-
tion provides an overview to the McBryde v. Robinson and 
Robinson v. Ariyoshi decisions. McBryde v. Robinson is the 1973 
Hawaii Supreme Court decision that allegedly changed the law 
of surface water rights in Hawaii. Robinson v. Ariyoshi is the 
Ninth Circuit opinion that affirmed a district court decision 
voiding the Hawaii Supreme Court's McBryde decision. 
The next section Doctrinal Pathology, is a study of the 
Ninth Circuit decision, examining how three false assumptions 
by the Ninth Circuit allowed the court to avoid the application 
of a number of doctrines designed to forestall the use of lower 
federal courts as appellate courts of the state. The three incor-
rect premises used by the court were, first, that the constitution-
ality of a final state judgment constituted a new and separate 
cause of action different from the underlying claim?O Second, 
that the appellate court's declaration of law constituted "state 
action" for the purpose of the fourteenth amendment.ll Third, 
8. There are several ramifications of the type of collateral attack in Robinson v. 
Ariyoshi. First, the United States Supreme Court would no longer perform its role 88 the 
exclusive appellate court for state judgments. Second, state court decisions would have 
no finality. Third, state courts would no longer be the final arbiters of state law. See 
generally, Chang, Unraveling Robinson v. Ariyoshi: Can Courts 'Take' Property? 2 U. 
HAWAII L. REV. 57, 58-59 (1979) [hereinafter cited 88 Chang, Unraveling Robinson]. See 
also, O'Connor, Trends in the Relationship Between the Federal and State Courts from 
the Perspective of a State Court Judge, 22 WM. & MARY L. REV. 801 (1981). 
9. [d. at 59. 
10. [d. at 89-90. 
11. The federal district court in Robinson v. Ariyoshi cited the Supreme Court's 
decision in Brinkerhoff-Faris Co. v. Hill, 281 U.S. 673, 690 (1930) for the proposition that 
state judicial action can violate the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. 441 
F. Supp. at 580 (D. Hawaii 1977). The brief of McBryde Sugar Company before the 
Ninth Circuit asserts that appellate decisionmaking can violate the fourteenth amend-
ment on the basis of Shelley v. Kraemer: 
Furthermore, the just compensation clause is made applicable 
to the states by the fourteenth amendment, and it has always 
been the law that the state action, which Section 1 of that 
Amendment restricts, comprehends action by 'its legislative, 
its executive, or its judicial authorities.' Ex parte Virginia, 100 
3
Chang: Federal Jurisdiction
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1986
126 GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 16:123 
that the rules enunciated in a judicial decision could create 
vested rights that were protected from later changes in the law 
by the just compensation clause.12 These three assumptions al-
lowed the court to arrive at a bizarre result, giving federal dis-
trict courts the power to set aside state supreme court decisions 
in the area of state property law, even after the state judgment 
had been reviewed by the United States Supreme Court. 
The third section, The Layman's View of a Taking, seeks to 
explain why the Ninth Circuit felt compelled to reach so far for 
this odd result. In the next section, Change and Due Process: 
The Myth, this article discusses the philosophical difficulties in 
explaining change in the law. The Conclusion notes the effect of 
political and social change in Hawaii on the development of 
water rights law. 
II. BACKGROUND 
McBryde u. Robinson involved a question of water rights in 
Hawaii. In 1959, various parties, including the state, sued each 
other in state court for a determination of their respective water 
rights. The parties had previously litigated some aspects of their 
claim. The parties proceeded to trial and obtained a state trial 
court judgment that apportioned the water according to Hawai-
ian water rights believed to be in effect at the time: 1) konohiki 
water rights (rights derived from the ownership of land upon 
which waters arise),13 2) prescriptive water rights14 and 3) ap-
U.S. 339, 347 (1880); Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 11, 17 
(1883); Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 14-18 (1948). 
Answering Brief of McBryde Sugar Co., Ltd., at 23, Robinson v. Ariyoshi, 753 F.2d 1468 
(9th Cir. 1985). 
12. With the exception of Muhlker v. New York and Harlem R. Co., 197 U.S. 544 
(1905), the Supreme Court has held that there are no property rights in the decisions of 
courts and changes in law are not a deprivation of due process. See Central Land Co. v. 
Laidley, 159 U.S. 103 (1895); Tidal Oil Co. v. Flanagan, 263 U.S. 444 (1924); Dunbar v. 
City of New York, 251 U.S. 516 (1920); Patterson v. Colorado, 205 U.S. 454 (1907). See 
generally Chang, Unraveling Robinson, supra note 8, at 68-71. 
13. Konohiki water rights are defined as rights to the normal surplus waters in a 
stream. The sugar companies contended that the proper rule in Hawaii was that the 
owner of the lands that were owned by the konohiki was also the owner of the normal 
surplus waters. The case of Hawaii Commercial Sugar Co. v. Wailuku Sugar Co., 15 Ha-
waii 675 (1904) is cited for that proposition. However, the Hawaii Supreme Court in 
answering the certified questions requested by the Ninth Circuit held that Hawaiian 
Commercial should not be given this reading. See Robinson v. Ariyoshi, 65 Hawaii 641, 
669-70, 658 P.2d 287, 307 (1982). In reviewing 125 years of case law on the issue of ko-
4
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purtenant water rights (a unique Hawaiian water right that 
grants the owner of land a right to a fixed quantity of water).l~ 
Up until this point the case was an ordinary action to allocate 
the waters. However, when the Hawaii Supreme Court decided 
the case on appeal, it challenged the premise upon which the 
parties had brought the action: that surface water in Hawaii 
could be privately "owned."16 While there is no serious talk 
about private ownership of the corpus of water in other states, 
some parties contended that Hawaiian law allowed parties to 
"own" the physical corpus of water. In other western states, 
when one speaks of "owning water," one is really communicating 
a notion of ownership of the right to use water.17 In Hawaii, law-
yers have argued that Hawaiian law is unique in providing for 
the ownership of water. 
The importance of the concept of private ownership of 
water becomes clear when one considers the two important rul-
ings made by the Hawaii Supreme Court. First, the court stated 
that, except for appurtenant and riparian rights, the state was 
the "owner" of all surface waters.16 Second, the court stated that 
no one could transfer water from one watershed to another.19 
Given the notion of private ownership of water in Hawaii 
that existed at the time, the court's assertion that the state was 
the true "owner" of water seemed to place title to the water in 
the state. Hence, this judicial declaration appeared to take prop-
erty. Furthermore, the court's rule against transferring water 
from one watershed to another was potentially disruptive in that 
nohiki rights, the Hawaii Supreme Court stated that konohiki water rights were not 
rights to a fixed body of water: "Surplus water, as discussed in our cases, did not present 
a right to a fixed quantity of water; it was the residuum of the waters in a natural water-
course after the rights of others had been accounted for." Id. at 672, 658 P.2d at 309. 
14. Prescriptive water rights refer to rights acquired against other parties on princi-
ples similar to that of adverse possession. See McBryde Sugar Co. v. Robinson, 54 Ha-
waii 174, 198, 504 P.2d 1330, 1344-45 (1973). 
15. Appurtenant water rights are rights to take the amount of water historically 
needed to grow taro. Id. at 187-91, 504 P.2d at 1339-41. 
16. See supra note 13. The sugar companies based their action on the rule that the 
owner of the lands formerly held by the konohiki was the owner of the normal surplus 
waters of the stream. 
17. See generally, Trelease, Government Ownership and Trusteeship of Water, 45 
CAL. L. REV. 638 (1957). 
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it would terminate the flow of water in many of the irrigation 
ditches that served the sugar industry.2o 
Subsequent to the Hawaii Supreme Court's decision, it ap-
peared that the only water rights left in Hawaii were riparian 
and appurtenant rights. Both required the use of the water only 
on the land that gave rise to the right. Konohiki water 
rights-the rights to the vast bulk of surface waters-no longer 
existed. The state was now the "owner" of these waters and as 
such, no one else could transfer the waters without state 
permission. 
A western water lawyer coming upon this scene would be 
somewhat amused. First, this talk of ownership of water would 
seem quite odd.21 Second, this view of so-called "state owner-
ship" of water would not appear all that threatening. In the 
west, statements of "state ownership" of water have been 
treated as the equivalent of the state power to regulate and 
manage the water.22 Indeed, prior appropriation exists where 
state constitutions or state statutes assert that the state is the 
owner of all waters.28 
In all fairness, the Hawaii Supreme Court did qualify its 
statement that the state was the owner of all waters. In a foot-
note it explained that it meant to convey the notion of publici 
juris.24 Indeed, if the court truly meant that the state held the 
waters as publici juris, or in other words, merely as an assertion 
of the government's power to regulate, then the state did not 
receive anything more than what the state already had under 
the police power. Thus, the contentious litigation since then may 
be much ado about nothing.25 
20. The lower federal court in Robinson v. Ariyoshi made the following findings of 
fact: "The sugar lands, if unirrigated, would be appraised as 'very poor pasture,' at an 
assessed value of $8 an acre, or $4 if dedicated to agricultural use. In contrast, 'cane' 
lands are assessed at $666 an acre (or $333 if dedicated), indicating $951.42 an acre as a 
sound value." 441 F. Supp. at 575. 
21. See Trelease, Government Ownership and Trusteeship of Water, 45 CAL. L. 
REV. 638 (1957). 
22. [d. at 643-45. 
23. [d. at 644. 
24. 54 Hawaii at 187 n.13, 504 P.2d at 1339 n.13. 
25. See Chang, Unraveling Robinson, supra note 8, at 91: 
When it comes to writing an epitaph for Robinson v. Ariyoshi 
as it concerns Hawaii water rights, one might fittingly pirate 
6
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The parties, nevertheless, treated the decision in McBryde 
as if it transferred corporeal ownership from private parties to 
the state. The state through its attorney general, seemingly ac-
quiesced in this understanding, perhaps on the theory that cor-
poreal ownership would maximize the state's power to regulate. 
The practical effect of this de facto stipulation between the state 
and the private parties regarding the meaning of "state owner-
ship" was to set the stage for the taking claim. Thus, the private 
parties characterized their cause of action against the state in 
district court as an original claim, and not an appeal of the Mc-
Bryde decision. The effect was to attack the state supreme court 
judgment in a federal district court. 
First, however, the losing parties sought a rehearing before 
the Hawaii Supreme Court. The sugar companies wanted to pre-
sent evidence of the devastating effect that the Hawaii Supreme 
Court rulings would have on their industry. Any ruling that gave 
the state the right to force the sugar companies to buy back wa-
ters clearly presented a frightening prospect. The Hawaii Su-
preme Court granted the rehearing but limited the argument to 
non-constitutional questions. The court confined the rehearing 
to the applicability of the Hawaii statute that was the basis for 
the two rulings.26 Thus, while the sugar companies were able to 
present their constitutional claims in the form of a motion for 
reconsideration, they were not allowed to present oral argument 
or introduce evidence before the supreme court. This limitation 
on rehearing later became significant. The federal district court 
in Robinson voided the McBryde decision, partly on the grounds 
that the refusal of the Hawaii Supreme Court to allow argument 
on these constitutional claims was a denial of due process.27 
[d. 
the title: "Much Ado About Nothing." Since the claim was 
based on the unjustified assumption that "ownership" in Mc· 
Bryde was used in the res publicae sense, the Robinson litiga· 
tion seems to have been a waste of resources. 
26. The Hawaii Supreme Court limited reargument to the following points: (1) the 
relevance of section 7·1 of the Hawaii Revised Statutes (1968) to the water rights of the 
parties, and (2) the legal theories which supported a conclusion that appurtenant water 
rights can be used on other parcels. McBryde Sugar Co. v. Robinson, 55 Hawaii 260, 261, 
517 P.2d 26, 27 (1973). 
27. As the district court noted in Robinson: 
Thereafter on the almost farcical "rehearing," although 
the due process issues were urged by the plaintiffs, the court 
refused to permit argument thereon or consider the same. 
7
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In a short opinion, the Hawaii Supreme Court reaffirmed its 
earlier opinion and denied reconsideration.28 Justice Levinson, 
who was formerly in the majority, changed his position and 
wrote a lengthy dissenting opinion disagreeing with the court's 
interpretation of the ancient statutes that led to the two critical 
rulings. He even included his own version of the translation of 
critical passages from Hawaiian to English to prove the court's 
error in interpretation.29 
Subsequent to this failure on rehearing, the sugar compa-
nies sought review in the United States Supreme Court and suc-
cinctly presented their claim that the decision in McBryde v. 
Robinson was an unconstitutional taking. The Court refused to 
review the case.30 There are two different interpretations of the 
meaning of this denial of certiorari. The state contends that the 
sugar companies had an appropriate opportunity in a federal fo-
rum, the United States Supreme Court, to present their consti-
tutional claims. Hence, subsequent to denial of certiorari, the 
McBryde judgment became final and barred any collateral at-
tack in federal district court. On the other hand, the sugar com-
panies argue that the Supreme Court's refusal to hear the case 
did not represent adequate review since the parties did not have 
a chance to fully argue those claims to the Court. Moreover, 
since the Supreme Court grants so few petitions, it could not 
serve as an adequate body to review the issues. Thus, the right 
to petition for certiorari was not the substitute for adequate fed-
eral fact finding on the effects of the McBryde decision. 
The next move by the sugar companies was unprecedented. 
The sugar companies, who formerly had been adverse parties in 
the McBryde state litigation, joined together as plaintiffs and 
sued in federal court alleging a violation of procedural and sub-
Rather, the court extended a clearly pro forma invitation to 
the plaintiffs to "prove to us why we were wrong" on issues 
and conclusions assumed sua sponte and decidlld sua sponte 
by the court. 
On this basis alone the judgment of the court would have 
to be declared void. . . . 
441 F. Supp. at 580. 
28. 55 Hawaii 260, 517 P.2d 26 (1973). 
29. Id. at 288-91, 517 P.2d at 41-44. 
30. 417 U.S. 976, cert. denied and appeal dismissed sub nom. McBryde Sugar Co. v. 
Hawaii, 417 U.S. 962 (1974). 
8
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stantive due process.3 ! Since the eleventh amendment bars suits 
against the state in federal courts, the plaintiff sugar companies 
had to find appropriate state officials to sue. The governor, at-
torney general and others were named as defendants. The na-
ture of the claim, however, focused on wrongdoing by the Hawaii 
Supreme Court. That court had allegedly denied them due pro-
cess by deciding the case in a manner not urged by the parties. 
Moreover, it was the Hawaii Supreme Court opinion itself that 
allegedly "took" the plaintiffs' property. 
No state official, however, had ever considered enforcing the 
decision. Indeed, it was not yet final and required remand to the 
trial court.32 Nor was there any indication that the state desired 
to sell the water. To the state's water managers, the idea of sell-
ing "state owned" water must have seemed somewhat far-
fetched. The primary responsibility of these officials was to con-
serve and manage the water. The state did not need 
"ownership" of water to assert those powers. The state already 
possessed those powers in the form of a groundwater manage-
ment statute. Thus, if anyone inflicted harm on the sugar com-
panies, it was clearly the justices of the Hawaii Supreme Court. 
Under the "taking" theory, the Supreme Court of Hawaii should 
have been named defendants. Under the plaintiffs' theory of 
"taking," the ownership of the water was transferred at the mo-
ment the state supreme court decision was issued. Tactically, 
however, naming the state supreme court as a defendant would 
have made it clear that the new suit was an appeal of the judg-
ment in McBryde. It is a fundamental rule that federal district 
courts should not act as the appellate courts of the state.33 Thus, 
31. As the district court noted in Robinson, "The two basic grounds of relief urged 
by the plaintiffs are that they were deprived of their property and their wat!lr 
rights-property rights of great financial value-without either procedural or substantive 
due process in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment." 441 F. Supp. at 580. 
32. The Hawaii Supreme Court in answering the certified questions from the Ninth 
Circuit stated: 
For McBryde necessarily left unresolved factual and legal is-
sues that would require a determination by a trial court prior 
to any final judgment respecting the distribution of the waters 
of the Hanapepe. These include the identification of riparian 
lands to which such rights attach and most significantly, the 
nature and scope of any remedies to be afforded the parties. 
Robinson v. Ariyoshi, 65 Hawaii 641 at 653, 658 P.2d 287 at 297. 
33. See Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923); see generally Chang, 
Rediscovering the Rooker Doctrine: Section 1983, Res Judicata and the Federal Courts, 
9
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instead of proceeding against the court, the plaintiff sugar com-
panies sought to enjoin state officials from enforcing the 
decision. 
In addition to the substantive due process claim, namely the 
taking of water by the McBryde decision, the sugar companies 
also based their complaint in federal district court on a number 
of procedural due process violations.34 First, the sugar compa-
nies argued that none of the parties had argued for the result in 
McBryde. Thus, the sua sponte nature of the court's decision 
violated due process. 311 Second, due process was violated when 
the Hawaii Supreme Court denied the sugar companies the right 
to contest the constitutionality of the McBryde decision on re-
hearing.36 Third, the plaintiff sugar companies urged that their 
rights to due process were violated when the Hawaii Supreme 
Court decided an issue allegedly not before the Court: McBryde 
held that surface water could not be transported out of the wa-
tershed of its origin. The sugar companies had long relied on the 
right to transport surface waters outside of the watershed to cul-
tivate and irrigate sugar lands. Since the original trial court pro-
ceeding in McBryde was limited to the determination of the 
ownership of the water, the supreme court's ruling prohibiting 
the transportation of water was an alleged violation of proce-
31 HASTINGS L. J. 1337 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Chang, Rooker Doctrine. 
34. As the district court stated in Robinson, "As appears above and as decried by 
Justice Marumoto in dissent in McBryde I, the effect of the judgment of the Supreme 
Court was to deprive the plaintiffs of their property, water and water rights, without 
affording any of them an opportunity to be heard in their defense." 441 F. Supp. at 580. 
For a discussion of the validity of the due process claims, see generally Chang, Unrav-
eling Robinson, supra note 8, at 78-81. 
35. The fact that a rule is declared by a court sua sponte is not reason to consider 
the rule a violation of procedural due process. The famous decision of the Supreme 
Court that the substantive law of the state should apply in federal diversity actions was 
laid down in a sua sponte fashion. See Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). The 
opinion of Justice Butler in Erie expresses this point: 
No constitutional question was suggested or argued below 
or here. And as a general rule, this Court will not consider any 
question not raised below and presented by the petition. [Ci-
tations omitted.] Here it does not decide either of the ques-
tions presented but, changing the rule of decision in force 
since the foundation of the Government, remands the case to 
be adjudged according to a standard never before deemed 
permissible. 
304 U.S. at 82 (Butler, J., dissenting). 
36. The author, in an earlier article, argued that this does not constitute a violation 
of procedural due process. See Chang, Unraveling Robinson, supra note 8, at 79. 
10
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dural due process.37 Finally, a fourth due process violation was 
alleged because the Hawaii Supreme Court failed to give res 
judicata effect to an earlier case, Territory v. Gay,38 which alleg-
edly had determined that several of the parties involved in the 
present McBryde case were the owners of the water.39 
The formerly adverse private parties who joined as plaintiffs 
thus rested their claims on two grounds: a taking of their prop-
erty by the Hawaii Supreme Court and the procedural due pro-
cess violations noted above. The federal district court assumed 
jurisdiction. This assumption of jurisdiction ignored both the res 
judicata40 effect of the now final state decision and the Rooker41 
limitation on federal district courts acting as the appellate 
courts of the state. After a short trial, the federal district court 
agreed with the plaintiff sugar companies that their constitu-
tional rights had been violated, enjoined the state from enforc-
ing the decision and voided the state supreme court decision in 
McBryde v. Robinson.42 In February 1985, after convening two 
three-judge panels and holding three separate hearings, the 
Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court opinion.43 The state of 
Hawaii sought review of this decision in the United States Su-
preme Court. 
On December 9, 1985, the Supreme Court asked the Solici-
tor General of the United States to file briefs expressing the 
37. If a court speaks on an issue not before it, the statement would be considered 
dicta and not a violation of procedural due process. ld. at 80. 
38. 31 Hawaii 376 (1930). 
39. The Ninth Circuit in Robinson expressed the view that the decision in Gay, 
which was affirmed by the Ninth Circuit in Territory of Hawaii v. Gay, 52 F.2d 356 (9th 
Cir. 1931) created vested water rights for two of the parties in Robinson: 
The water law, at least between the territorial government and 
the Gay and Robinson interests, thereafter remained settled 
until statehood. 
Relying upon the decrees in Territory 1 and 11, Gay and 
Robinson proceeded with further development of their planta· 
tions. . . . By any reasonable interpretation of the word 
"vested," Gay and Robinson's rights to the continued use of 
their water and related engineering works had become vested. 
753 F.2d at 1473·74. 
40. See generally, Chang, Unraveling Robinson, supra note 8, at 84·90. 
41. ld. at 81·83. 
42. 441 F. Supp. at 586. 
43. 753 F.2d 1468 (9th Cir. 1985). 
11
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view of the United States.·· This indicates that the issues in-
volved in Robinson v. Ariyoshi are broad in scope and involve 
questions of fed~ralism and of constitutional concern. The result 
effectuated by the Ninth Circuit must appear quite startling: a 
federal district court voiding a final state decision on a question 
of traditional concern to the states-water law. Moreover, the 
action of the district court, ostensibly justified by the finding of 
substantive and procedural due process violations, came after 
the aggrieved parties had presented the same arguments to the 
Supreme Court and had been denied review. 
The action of the Ninth Circuit and the federal district 
court is all the more amazing when one considers these two 
courts needed to sidestep a number of different doctrines to 
reach the result: res judicata, ripeness, sovereign immunity, the 
Rooker principle that only the United States Supreme Court 
may properly review the constitutionality of decisions of state 
supreme courts, and the essential freedom of courts to overrule 
earlier precedents. 
Another category of objections might be broadly termed 
"jurisprudential." This set of objections focuses on the assump-
tion made by the federal district court and the Ninth Circuit 
that final judicial decisions such as McBryde v. Robinson "take" 
property. This issue is set amidst the ongoing debate as to 
whether judges "discover" or "make" the law.4& Robinson v. 
Ariyoshi proves that the answer to this question has pragmatic 
consequences in terms of modern constitutional law. If jurispru-
dence is founded on a belief that judges discover law and that 
changes in the law are reflections of discovering a more accurate 
version of the law, then a change in law is not a "taking." The 
only premise on which one may even assert that a state supreme 
court decision has "taken" the property is one in which judges 
44. 106 s. Ct. 565 (1985). 
45. Professor Levy makes the following point: 
Even today "when a judge invents his own law and con-
cocts his version of the facts, he will not fail to profess obedi-
ence to the accepted tradition." He still purports to be finding 
the very law which he has himself laboriously rebraided. The 
hold of an inherited legal philosophy controls our mind 
against our will and forces us into intellectual circumlocutions 
which would shame a medieval schoolman (footnote omitted). 
Levy, Realist Jurisprudence and Prospective Overruling, 109 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 4 (1960). 
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are deemed to "make" law. 
Largely through the efforts of the legal realists, courts and 
commentators have begun to admit the degree to which courts 
"make" law. Legal realism is generally viewed as a progressive 
movement allowing law to more adequately meet the needs of a 
changing society.46 The Ninth Circuit's decision represents 
ironic misuse of legal realism: the legal realists never thought 
that being honest about what courts do would equip parties with 
the means of stifling progressive change in law.47 
III. DOCTRINAL PATHOLOGY 
If one dissects the Ninth Circuit's opinion in Robinson· v. 
Ariyoshi, one discovers three premises that led to the final re-
sult. As stated earlier these are 1) that the correctness of a deci-
sion constitutes a new cause of action, 2) that state supreme 
court decisions can "take" property, and 3) that the rules of 
prior decisions can create vested rights. This article argues that 
these three premises are false since they would lead to a lack of 
finality in the judicial system. They are inconsistent with the in-
herent requirements of a legal system that must accomplish two 
goals-resolve disputes with finality and allow the law to evolve 
and change. 
Proof of the invalidity of these assumptions is the head-on 
conflict of the Ninth Circuit's decision with many of the doc-
trines requiring finality or the proper respect of state court judg-
ments. The following section shows how the result reached in 
Robinson v. Ariyoshi required the Ninth Circuit to ignore these 
46. [d. 
47. The lower federal district court asserted that McBryde v. Robinson was a deci-
sion based on public policy. Since the Hawaii Supreme Court had decided to "make" 
instead of "declare" law, its actions could be deemed a taking: 
It [the McBryde decision] was strictly a "public-policy" deci-
sion with no prior underlying "legal" justification therefor. 
The majority wanted to see streams running down to the sea 
on an all-year-around basis. Knowing that this was squarely 
contrary to the accepted state of water rights law of Hawaii, 
the court first declared that the rule of stare decisis did not 
apply to water rights law. In this case stare decisis interfered 
with the court's policy. 
441 F. Supp. at 566-67. 
13
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doctrines. 
A. RIPENESS AND SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY 
There were several barriers to federal district court jurisdic-
tion in Robinson v. Ariyoshi. First, a lack of ripeness, since there 
was no concrete state action to judge.48 The state never took any 
action to enforce McBryde. Indeed, it could not take such action 
since the decision ordered a remand to the state trial court. If 
this is true then, the federal district court's action essentially 
constituted an injunction against further state judicial proceed-
ings.49 Moreover, the Hawaii Supreme Court held, in answering 
the certified questions from the Ninth Circuit, that the McBryde 
decision essentially expressed a declaration of the state's public 
trust responsibility over the waters.1I0 This declaration of public 
trust is more akin to a reaffirmation of the police power of the 
state to manage and regulate the water than an attempt to 
transfer the body of water to the state. 
If McBryde merely represented an affirmation of the police 
power, then it is even more clear that an action to enjoin state 
officers is not ripe. III The case would only be ripe if, pursuant to 
48. In its answers to the certified questions, the Hawaii Supreme Court stated that 
the McBryde judgment was not complete and needed to be remanded to the trial court 
for a specific allocation of the quantities of water to be accorded the parties. Robinson v. 
Ariyoshi, 65 Hawaii at 653, 658 P.2d at 297. 
49. Under the Younger doctrine, federal courts should abstain from intervening in 
incomplete state civil proceedings. Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225 (1972). 
50. In its answers to the certified questions, the Hawaii Supreme Court stated that 
state ownership was not a corporeal ownership, but was akin to a public trust: 
This is not ownership in the corporeal sense where the State 
may do with the property as it pleases; rather, we comprehend 
the nature of the State's ownership as retention of such au-
thority to assure the continued existence and beneficial appli-
cation of the resource for the common good. 
The nature of this ownership is thus akin to the title held 
by all states in navigable waterways which was recognized by 
the United States Supreme Court in Illinois Central Railroad 
u. Illinois [citations omitted]: 
It is a title held in trust for the people of the State that 
they may enjoy the navigation of the water .... 
65 Hawaii at 674, 658 P.2d at 310. 
51. There are two reasons why Robinson u. Ariyoshi did not present an actual case 
or controversy. First, the judgment was not complete. See supra note 48. Second, the 
declaration of a public trust, without any concrete action by state officials, presents no 
claim to judge. The Amended Judgment on Remand issued by the lower court in Robin-
son after the decision of the Ninth Circuit gives further indication that the case was not 
14
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a state statute, state officials issued limited duration permits 
that substantially diminished the economic value of water to a 
particular user.1I2 An injunction prior to that stage is analogous 
to an injunction against zoning that may eventually go too far. 
In addition, the Ninth Circuit took the position that ripe-
ness exists where there is a "cloud" over property rights. lls The 
rules announced in many appellate decisions create a "clouds" of 
some sort over the rights of the immediate parties as well as per-
sons with an economic stake in the legal issues involved.1I4 For 
the Ninth Circuit to assert that there is a ripe controversy justi-
fying an original action in federal court simply because there is a 
"cloud" over the rights of one of the parties is to interpret the 
doctrine of ripeness in a way that renders it meaningless.1I11 
The case might be ripe if the corpus of the waters were 
transferred by the McBryde decision itself. If this is true then 
the suit should be dismissed as barred by the eleventh amend-
ment. lIs No one denies that the state could exercise its eminent 
ripe: 
McBryde constitutes a cloud on the surface water rights of the 
private property owners, but because the defendant State Offi· 
cials in these proceedings have taken no steps to interfere 
with, and have denied that they are presently planning to take 
steps to interfere with the property of the Plaintiffs, McBryde 
Sugar Company, Limited, Olokele Sugar Company, Limited, 
and the Small Owners, as declared above, an injunction 
against the defendant State Officials may be premature at this 
time. Thus, no injunctive relief will be granted at this time 
since the declaration of the rights of the parties herein would 
appear sufficient to protect the rights of the private parties. 
Amended Judgment on Remand at 4-5, Robinson v. Ariyoshi (Civ. No. 74-32) (D. Ha-
waii, Sept. 24, 1985). 
52. If the water rights of the parties could be considered settled and such rights 
were replaced with short term permits that substantially reduced the amount of water 
allowed, then a taking claim is conceivable. Even then, the parties are not likely to suc-
ceed in invalidating a state statute that is applied in a rational manner. See generally, 
Kloos, Aipa and Chang, Water Rights, Water Regulation and the "Taking Issue" in 
Hawai'i, Technical Report No. 120, Water Resources Research Center, University of Ha-
waii (May 1983). See also, Cherry v. Steiner, 716 F.2d 687 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 466 
U.S. 931 (1984) (upholding the Arizona Groundwater Management Act of. 1980). 
53. 753 F.2d at 1471. 
54. It is obvious that new decisions can have economic implications for non-parties. 
55. To satisfy the "case or controversy" requirement of article III of the Constitu-
tion, a plaintiff must show real and immediate possibility of direct injury, not conjectural 
or hypothetical harm. City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 101-05 (1983). 
56. The eleventh amendment states: "The judicial power of the United States shall 
15
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domain powers and acquire the water or water rights of the 
sugar companies. In that case, the state would be required to 
pay just compensation. If the case is ripe in the sense that the 
waters have already been transferred to the state by the Mc-
Bryde decision itself, then the suit would be against the state for 
payment of just compensation. When a suit against named state 
officials seeks the award of monetary relief for retroactive con-
duct, it must be barred by the eleventh amendment.1i7 This re-
sult may seem odd in that it appears to eliminate any possible 
cause of action against a state that commits a taking.1i8 Prior to 
the alleged taking, the case is not ripe. Immediately after the 
taking, the claim for money damage is precluded because of the 
eleventh amendment. The eleventh amendment, however, only 
acts to bar the suit in federal district court. In the normal case, 
one could sue in state court to compel payment of just 
compensation. 
The basic flaw lies in the visualization of the McBryde deci-
sion as a taking, much as if it were a state bulldozer that de-
stroyed plaintiffs' property. The error is in viewing an appellate 
decision as "taking" property. 59 As discussed here, decisions do 
not take property.60 Rather, they declare the rights of the par-
ties. In other words, McBryde, even if viewed as a decision de-
termining the ownership of the surface waters, must be seen as 
declaring that the state has always been the owner of the 
waters.61 
The suit in Robinson v. Ariyoshi could be interpreted as 
simply seeking a declaration of a taking without seeking pay-
ment of compensation. If successful, the parties would have to 
seek valuation of their claims in state court. This would put the 
state judge in a difficult position since the state court would be 
bound by the Hawaii Supreme Court's decision that McBryde 
not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted 
against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects 
of any Foreign State." U.S. CON ST. amend. XI. 
57. Quern v. Jordon, 440 U.S. 332 (1979). 
58. One possible means of avoiding this result is for the parties to bring an action in 
ejectment against the state. Ct. United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196 (1882). 
59. See generally, Chang, Unravelling Robinson, supra note 8. 
60. [d. at 57. 
61. If the state has always been the owner of the water then the McBryde decision 
itself could not constitute a taking. 
16
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was simply a reaffirmation of the public trust doctrine. At the 
same time, the state judge would have to consider the argument 
that he should apply full faith and credit to the federal district 
court's judgment declaring a taking.62 
In short, the action in Robinson v. Ariyoshi did not present 
an actual case or controversy since it was a disguised appeal of 
the McBryde decision.63 It is not ripe in the same manner that 
any declaration of law, without more, does not create a case or 
controversy.6. One cannot enjoin a court's declaration of law, 
just as one cannot enjoin the effects of diCta.66 The lack of ripe-
ness is only one aspect of the inherent falsity of the cause of 
action in Robinson. 
B. THE ROOKER DOCTRINE AND RES JUDICATA 
Assuming that the Ninth Circuit was correct about ripeness, 
it still had to deal with two doctrines which declare that the fed-
eral courts should not entertain state claims that were, or should 
have been, raised and decided in a prior state proceeding. Two 
almost identical doctrines, the Rooker principle,66 that federal 
courts should not act as appellate courts of the states, and the 
claim preclusion aspect of res judicata command this result.67 
The chief difference between these two is that Rooker is a juris-
dictional bar and res judicata is a defense.68 Thus, a federal 
judge could raise the Rooker bar to jurisdiction on the court's 
own motion, at any time in the proceedings.69 On the other 
hand,' res judicata is waived unless raised by a party.70 
62. Arguably, the declaratory judgment in federal court would be res judicata as to 
the issue of a taking in the subsequent state court action to determine valuation. Cf. 
Stoll v. Gottlieb, 305 U.S. 165 (1938). 
63. A subsequent action is a disguised appeal of an earlier action if the law of the 
jurisdiction rendering the first judgment would deem the second action barred by its law 
9f claim preclusion. For an explanation see Chang, Rooker Doctrine, supra note 33, at 
1357-63. 
64. Acts of appellate courts in declaring the law do not create an original cause of 
action. [d. at 1346-49. 
65. Dicta, by its very nature, has no legal effect on the immediate parties, or others, 
to the decision. 
66. Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923). 
67. See Chang, Rooker Doctrine, supra note 33, at 1350-56. 
68. [d. at 1355. 
69. [d. 
70. [d. See Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592, 607 n. 19 (1976). 
17
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In response to the argument that the Rooker or claim pre-
clusion doctrine barred the action in Robinson, the sugar compa-
nies would assert two objections. First, they would argue that it 
is not true that the claim was considered in the prior state pro-
ceeding.71 Second, even if the claim had been implicitly consid-
ered, the failure to allow the sugar companies to fully brief the 
claim or present factual evidence as to the implications of the 
new McBryde decision constituted a denial of due process.72 Ar-
guably, both grounds justify the refusal of the federal district 
court to apply res judicata.73 Similarly, it can be asserted that 
both grounds serve as an exception to the Rooker doctrine that 
lower federal courts should not act as appellate courts of the 
state.74 
The Ninth Circuit agreed with the sugar companies and 
held that where the state court never entertained a claim, a 
lower federal court is not barred from considering that claim.711 
Of course, this reasoning misses the most obvious objection of' 
all. As noted earlier, the constitutionality or correctness of a de-
cision is not a new and separate claim different from the under-
lying claim. Even if one persists in the belief that it is a new and 
separate claim, then, it is still true that a court rendering a deci-
sion considers and resolves affirmatively the constitutional valid-
ity of its own decision by the very act of rendering the decision. 
Every decision represents an implicit decision of constitu-
tional validity.76 It would be superfluous for every court to add 
71. 753 F.2d at 1472. 
72. 441 F. Supp. at 564. 
73. 753 F.2d at 1472. 
74. The Ninth Circuit, holding that the failure to entertain a claim was an exception 
to the subject matter principle of Rooker, stated that. "if Rooker were a blanket jurisdic-
tional bar precluding the litigation of claims even if there had been no actual state court 
opportunity to litigate them, Rooker would swallow the 'full and fair opportunity to liti-
gate' limitation to res judicata clearly established elsewhere by the Supreme Court." 753 
F.2d at 1472. 
75. The Ninth Circuit also held that "[w)here a state court has refused to entertain 
federal constitutional claims, a federal court violates the precepts of neither subject mat-
ter jurisdiction nor res judicata by hearing those claims." Id. at 1473. 
76. Cf, Cromwell v. County of Sac, 94 U.S. 351, 353 (1876) ("[T)hat a judgment 
estops not only as to every ground of recovery or defense actually presented in the ac-
tion, but also as to every ground which might have been presented, is strictly accurate."). 
See also Grubb v. Public Util. Comm'n, 281 U.S. 470, 477 (1929); Grossgold v. Supreme 
Court of Ill., 557 F.2d 122, 124-25 (7th Cir. 1977); Tang v. New York Supreme Court, 487 
F.2d 138, 141 n.2 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 906 (1974). 
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at the end of its opinion: "Moreover, we decide that the decision 
reached above is constitutional." Obviously, no court considers 
the constitutionality of its own decision and then rules in the 
negative. Hence, every state and federal decision implicitly af-
firms the court's view that its acts are constitutional. It is logical 
to presume that all courts believe they are issuing decisions 
which are constitutional and do not intentionally issue decisions 
that they secretly believe are unconstitutional. Courts may be 
wrong as to the constitutionality of a decision, but it cannot logi-
cally be argued that the issue was not decided. Hence, in the 
case of state supreme court decisions, the United States Su-
preme Court may ultimately decide that the state court was 
wrong as to the constitutionality of the decision, but there is no 
question that the issue is always implicitly considered and im-
plicitly decided. Recent Supreme Court decisions have held that 
a claim that should have been raised in the state proceeding 
cannot be relitigated in a federal proceeding." A fortiori, claims 
that were raised and decided even implicitly, are also barred.78 
This result is commanded by the full faith and credit clause.79 If 
the state law would have barred relitigation, the federal court 
must provide the same result.80 This is true even if the federal 
court believes that the state court erred in its application of 
state law.81 
The second objection that the sugar companies would make 
to the application of Rooker or res judicata is that this new 
claim regarding the constitutionality of McBryde was not fully 
77. See, e.g., Parsons Steel, Inc. v. First Alabama Bank, 106 S.Ct. 768 (1986) (even if 
the state court mistakenly rejected respondent's res judicata claim, this does not justify a 
federal court injunction against enforcement of state court judgment); Marrese v. Ameri-
can Academy of Orthopedic Surgeons, 84 L.Ed.2d 274, 105 S.Ct. 1327 (1985) (lower fed-
eral courts must apply res judicata law of the state in which judgment was entered); 
Migra v. Warren City School Dist., 465 U.S. 75 (1984) (with respect to claims that could 
have been raised in the prior state proceeding but were not, the federal court must apply 
claim preclusion to bar such a claim if the state law of the state which rendered the 
judgment would also apply claim preclusion); Kremer v. Chemical Construction Corp., 
456 U.S. 461 (1982) (federal court must apply the res judicata law of the state that ren-
dered the allegedly preclusive judgment); Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90 (1980) (same). 
78. C{. Migra v. Warren City School Dist., 465 U.S. 75 (1984) (applying the law of 
the state rendering the judgment to bar claims reserved and not raised in the prior state 
proceeding). 
79. 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (1976). 
80. See cases cited supra note 77. 
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and fairly litigated in the previous action. S2 In other words, res 
judicata should not apply because the state supreme court vio-
lated procedural due process by failing to allow the sugar com-
panies the right to address the constitutionality of McBryde in 
overruling earlier precedents. 
The Ninth Circuit was wrong on two counts. The system did 
afford the sugar companies two opportunities to raise their con-
stitutional objections and the United States Supreme Court has 
required much less in terms of procedural due process in its own 
proceedings. First, the sugar companies had an opportunity to 
notify the Hawaii Supreme Court of their constitutional objec-
tions when they petitioned the Hawaii Supreme Court for a re-
hearing. S3 Second, when the sugar companies sought review in 
the Supreme Court they asserted their constitutional concerns in 
their petition for certiorari.s4 It is true that the Hawaii Supreme 
82. 441 F. Supp. at 580. 
83. McBryde Sugar Company stated in its answering brief before the Ninth Circuit: 
Timely petitions for rehearing and motions for an opportunity 
to present evidence and argument on the constitutional claims 
were filed by McBryde, G & R, Olokele and the Small Own-
ers .... On June 18, 1973, the Supreme Court ordered the 
parties to file briefs limited to two questions framed by the 
Court which in no manner related to the constitutional issues, 
or provided opportunity for a hearing on McBryde'S federal 
claims (citations omitted). 
Answering Brief of McBryde Sugar Co., Defendant-Appellee at 9, Robinson v. Ariyoshi, 
753 F.2d 1468 (9th Cir. 1985). 
84. McBryde Sugar Company and Olokele Sugar Company joined in an appeal, or 
petition for certiori, from the Hawaii Supreme Court's McBryde decision and made the 
following constitutional claim in their appeal: 
The property rights of both Olokele and McBryde have now 
been taken. The Hawaii Supreme Court's construction of Stat. 
L. Kamehameha III 81 (1847) has conferred ownership of all 
water on the State of Hawaii, the term "ownership" not being 
used by the Court in the publici juris sense, since prescription 
of the right to use water is precluded. Moreover, the Court's 
construction of Hawaii Rev. Stat. § 7-1 has taken some portion 
of Gay & Robinson's normal flow surplus water for use of 
other riparians. Under the decisions of this Court, a taking 
without compensation has occurred. [Citations omitted.] 
Olokele also submits that the Hawaii Supreme Court has vio-
lated the Due Process Clause, by failing, in the absence of cir-
cumstances relevant under the Due Process Clause (such as 
the existence of a judgment rendered without jurisdiction or 
procured by fraud), to accord res judicata effect to the deci-
sion of Territory v. Gay . . . . 
Appellants' Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 35, McBryde Sugar Co. v. Hawaii, cert. 
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Court denied them a right to argue the constitutional issues on 
rehearing and that the U.S. Supreme Court denied certiorari, 
depriving them of the opportunity to brief fully both courts at 
length on these issues. This does not, however, prove a denial of 
procedural due process. Rather, it simply shows that both courts 
did not consider these claims worthy of reconsideration or cer-
tiorari. No court is required by the constitution to provide full 
briefing and oral argument on every issue that a party contends 
is at stake. In summary affirmance proceedings, the Supreme 
Court of the United States has ruled at times without oral argu-
ment or briefs from the losing side.8Ci 
denied and appeal dismissed, 417 U.S. 962 (1974). 
Moreover, a number of small farmers joined in the petition for certiorari on the side 
of the sugar companies. Their constitutional claim was that the McBryde decision's rule 
against transfer of water deprived them of economic rights since they were engaged in 
the sale of their water rights. There is no basis for these parties to participate in the 
present action. Since these parties agree that the issue of transfer and severance of the 
appurtenant water rights of the parties were never raised, then, any judicial statements 
on the issue in McBryde must have been dicta. As dicta, the statement could not have 
deprived them of their property. In their brief to the Supreme Court, the small farmers 
state that the issue of transfer was never raised: 
The State of Hawaii never challenged Petitioners' rights to 
sever the ownership of their water rights from the land with 
which they originally passed as an appurtenance, or to transfer 
those waters for use on other lands, whether or not within the 
watershed of origin. . . . The sole issues before the trial court 
affecting Petitioners were the determination of what lands had 
appurtenant water rights by virtue of ancient Hawaiian taro 
culture thereon and the amount of water to which each such 
acre was entitled. 
Petitioners' Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 5-6, Albarado v. Hawaii, cert. denied, 417 
U.S. 962 (1974). 
The small owners also challenged the constitutionality of the McBryde decision in 
their petition. [d. at 11. The small owners also raised these same claims in their petition 
for rehearing before the Hawaii Supreme Court. Id. at 11 n.16. In any event, the Hawaii 
Supreme Court, in a separate case, has ruled that appurtenant water rights cannot be 
severed and transferred. Such rights can only be extinguished by deed. Reppun v. Board 
of Water Supply, 65 Hawaii 531, 656 P.2d 57 (1982) cert. denied sub nom. Board of 
Water Supply v. Nakata, 105 S. Ct. 2016 (1985). 
85. As Stern and Gressman in their treatise on Supreme Court practice point out, 
the Supreme Court has summarily affirmed and reversed cases arising from the lower 
courts without briefings on the merits by either side: 
In such cases it is unlikely that the appellee will have filed a 
motion to affirm on the ground that no substantial question 
has been presented .... But unless ... counsel is familiar 
with the Court's practice in this respect, he will not be fore-
warned that the case may be lost on the appeal papers without 
his having filed anything at all. 
STERN AND GRESSMAN, SUPREME COURT PRACTICE, 379 (1979). This is a practice which the 
Supreme Court views as comporting with the requirements of procedural due process. 
21
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Furthermore, the sugar companies argued they were denied 
procedural due process because they were not allowed to present 
factual evidence as to how the McBryde decision would affect 
the operation of the sugar industry as a whole. When landmark 
decisions are issued by a court sua sponte, parties or interested 
amicus curiae are often denied the opportunity to present to the 
court facts as to how the new rule would affect any particular 
segment of society. In one of the most celebrated sua sponte de-
cisions of all, Erie v. Tompkins,86 the Supreme Court implicitly 
rejected any notion that due process guaranteed the parties a 
right to present evidence as to how Erie would affect the evolu-
tion of state law. 
None Of the arguments presented here conflict with the as-
sertion that new and separate claims, different from the under-
lying claim, can arise during the judicial process. For example, 
suppose during an appellate argument an annoyed justice of a 
state supreme court leaned over and banged an advocate over 
the head with a gavel. Or, suppose a state supreme court had a 
rule which allowed defendants' brief to be one hundred pages 
and plaintiffs' brief to be four.8? Or, suppose in attaching prop-
erty, sheriffs enforcing a judicial decree maliciously shot a pro-
testing defendant. In each of these cases, the resolution of the 
underlying case in a final judgment would not necessarily termi-
nate the s~parate action brought in tort, equal protection, or as a 
civil rights< action. But these instances of "state action" or "judi-
cial misconduct" are different from the alleged judicial wrong in 
McBryde. One might term the above "process" acts. On the 
other hand, McBryde involved a court acting in its "appellate" 
capacity.88 
United States v. Haley, 358 U.S. 644 (1958); Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942); 
Chamberlin v. Dade County Board, 377 U.S. 402 (1963); and School District of Abington 
Township v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1962). Moreover, the Supreme Court has summarily 
reversed cases without briefing from the losing side. Vachon v. New Hampshire, 414 U.S. 
478 (1974); Eaton v. City of Tulsa, 415 U.S. 697 (1974); Menna v. New York, 423 U.S. 61 
(1975) and Texas v. White, 423 U.S. 67 (1975). The constitution clearly does not require 
oral argument on every issue or on every appeal. STERN AND GRESSMAN, SUPREME COURT 
PRACTICE, 317 (1978). 
86. 304 U.S. 64 (1938). 
87. Cf. Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956) (violation of due process and equal pro-
tection clauses for state judicial system to condition appeal on the ability of an individ-
ual to purchase a transcript). 
88. The author, in a different context, has defined "appellate acts," as opposed to 
"original acts" as follows: 
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The lower federal court in Robinson v. Ariyoshi broadly as-
serted that judicial action could be the basis for state action. 
McBryde does not involve the enforcement of a judgment. Ap-
pellate acts, in the form of judicial decisions by properly consti-
tuted state supreme courts, are not "state action." If appellate 
decisionmaking, without more, constituted state action, many fi-
nal decisions could be collaterally attacked in federal trial 
courts. Such a theory would undermine the finality of the judi-
cial process. There would be two routes to appeal cases. State 
supreme court decisions could be appealed either to the U.S. Su-
preme Court or to federal district court as was done in 
Robinson.s9 
In conclusion, both Rooker and res judicata apply to bar the 
subsequent federal action in Robinson v. Ariyoshi. It is errone-
ous thinking and bad theory to contend that the correctness of a 
judicial decision constitutes a new and separate claim from the 
underlying action. Even so, the normal rules of res judicata ap-
ply to bar this "new" claim from being raised in federal court. 
Once the McBryde judgment had been reviewed by the United 
States Supreme Court, the system as a whole had spoken. The 
judicial process would be substantially weakened if another part 
of the system could revive a dispute which had been finally 
adjudicated. 
C. UNFORCED ERRORS: SIX ANSWERS IN SEARCH OF AN AUDIENCE 
Probably the most disturbing aspect of Robinson v. 
Ariyoshi was the Ninth Circuit's decision to ignore the answers 
The term "original acts" means acts, such as automobile acci-
dents, breaches of contract, employment termination, and the 
like, that give rise to legal claims. In contrast, appellate acts 
are events that occur within the legal system: the decision of 
any court, even one of first resort, is thus an "appellate act." 
Within the concept of appellate acts there exists a distinction 
between declaration acts (acts of declaring law) and process 
acts (the procedural manner in which the system treats a liti-
gant). Since the procedural manner in which the system treats 
a litigant could constitute a separate claim; claims based on 
procedural abuses should not be dismissed under Rooker. Fed-
eral court challenges to the substantive determinations of 
state court decisions (declaration acts), however, are imper-
missible under Rooker [citations omitted). 
Chang, Rooker Doctrine, supra note 33, at 1346-47. 
89. [d. at 1345-46. 
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it requested from the Hawaii Supreme Court concerning the 
meaning of McBryde.90 This is unfortunate since the answers 
given by the Hawaii Supreme Court rendered moot the conflict 
between the two sides. The answers to the certified questions 
eliminated the harm upon which plaintiffs had based their case. 
Thus, the decision to ignore these answers is curious. It would 
appear that the Ninth Circuit was seeking predetermined an-
swers and was willing to disregard nonconforming answers. If 
this is so it would be an improper use of the certification proce-
dure. It would also seem to violate the well-established rule that 
a state supreme court has a sovereign right to determine ques-
tions of state law and that such determinations should be bind-
ing on federal courts.91 
In its answers to the six questions, the Hawaii Supreme 
Court made two statements which in effect mooted the case. 
First, the court withdrew its earlier ruling absolutely prohibiting 
water from being transported outside of the watershed.92 Sec-
ond, it held that its ruling on "state ownership" of water was not 
meant to transfer the water in a corporeal way to the state. In-
stead, the court explained that it had asserted that the state had 
a public trust over the waters.93 
90. Robinson v. AriY03hi, 65 Hawaii 642, 658 P.2d 287 (1982). 
91. Herb v. Pitcairn, 324 U.S. 117 (1945). 
92. The Hawaii Supreme Court in its answers to the certified questions clarified its 
earlier statements: 
Thus we take issue with the federal district court's characteri-
zation of McBryde as "restraining the free diversion of surface 
waters for use outside the lands of the plaintiffs to which they 
are appurtenant." [Citation omitted]. McBryde merely estab-
lished that there was no right on the part of the plaintiffs to 
benefit from such diversions. But, as was the case in our pre-
existing law, governing the transport of water, diversions will 
be restrained only after a careful assessment of the interests 
and circumstances involved indicates a need for restraint. A 
delineation of these interests and circumstances were not 
before us in McBryde and we did not order the cessation of 
any diversions. Consistently with our statutory prerogative, we 
merely defined the appropriate scope of the rights established 
in the case and left the actual enforcement of these limitation 
to appropriate subsequent actions brought by the parties in-
cluding the State. 
65 Hawaii at 649-50, 658 P.2d at 295 (footnote omitted, emphasis in original). 
93. See supra note 50. The United States Supreme Court reviews judgments not 
opinions. See Chevron v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 104 S.Ct. 2778 (1984). 
Thus, considered in light of the Answers to Certified Questions, the judgment in Mc-
24
Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 16, Iss. 1 [1986], Art. 11
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol16/iss1/11
1986] FEDERAL JURISDICTION 147 
These two interpretations of the McBryde rulings com-
pletely gut the plaintiffs' taking claim. First, the court stated 
that the original decision only meant there was no absolute right 
to transfer water. Such transfers must be reasonable in light of 
the possibility of harm to other water users.94 These statements 
are within the mainstream of riparian rights. Moreover, they are 
particularly reasonable in an island state with a scarcity of water 
resources. 
Secondly, the certified answers stated that the term "state 
ownership," as used in the original McBryde decision, meant 
that the state had a "public trust" over the waters. With this 
reinterpretation of the McBryde decision, it could not be argued 
that decision itself transferred the corpus of the waters. The no-
tion of a state public trust over the waters is akin to that of the 
police power to regulate.911 Thus, the declaration of "state owner-
ship" in McBryde could not constitute the state action that took 
plaintiffs' property. Since, the McBryde decision cannot be said 
to "take" property, and since the state could not enforce Mc-
Bryde, the substantive due process claim of the plaintiffs must 
fail in its entirety. 
In the alternative, the sugar companies might assert that 
the declaration of a public trust may be the basis for a future 
taking. This may be so if a limited duration permit system were 
adopted in Hawaii and the amount of water allowed the sugar 
companies were substantially reduced. But the constitutionality 
of a permit system as implemented is a completely different 
question from the constitutionality of McBryde. It would only 
become ripe as a question of law when and if such a permit sys-
tem were adopted and implemented. 
It was never necessary for the state to "own" the water to 
accomplish its goals of management and regulation. It may have 
been thought that ownership of the body of water would allow 
the state to sell the sugar companies the water they were using 
prior to McBryde. However, no official of the State Department 
of Land and Natural Resources, charged with administration 
and regulation of water, has taken the position that the state 
Bryde u. Robinson certainly did not take petitioners' property. 
94. See supra note 92. 
95. See supra note 50. 
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should sell water to the sugar companies as a means of raising 
revenues. This is simply not a realistic political position. Sugar 
is one of the three major industries in Hawaii, with approxi-
mately 8,500 employees.96 The sugar industry is completely de-
pendent on federal price supports to stay in business.97 Raising 
production costs by charging for the use of water would only 
hasten the demise of the sugar industry and lead to catastrophic 
consequences for the state. 
The clarification in the certified answers may have been a 
recognition that it was never in the state's interest to "own the 
water" in a corporeal sense. Like every other state, the state 
needs the power to regulate and manage water. Under the police 
powers inherent in its sovereignty, the state already possessed 
much of the necessary power. Indeed, the state already had a 
groundwater management statute.98 A new statute granting simi-
lar powers to manage surface water could have been enacted 
with or without declaration of a public trust over such waters by 
the Hawaii Supreme Court.99 The clarification in the certified 
answers that "state ownership" meant "public trust" merely re-
96. Total number of jobs in the sugar industry has declined from 14,635 in 1960 to 
9,000 in 1979 and less in 1986. See Plasch, Hawaii's Sugar Industry: Problems, Outlook 
and Urban Growth Issues at 70, Dep't of Planning and Economic Development, State 
of Hawaii, April 1981. 
97. Under previous sugar legislation, quotas, import levies and taxes were used to 
maintain domestic sugar prices at levels profitable to domestic producers. Id. at 130. 
Sugar price supports were recently included in the Food Security Act of 1985, 99 Stat. 
1354. 
98. Hawaii's Ground-Water Use Act allows the Department of Land and Natural 
Resources to designate areas and manage the withdrawal of groundwater from these ar-
eas through a permit system. HAWAII REV. STAT. §§ 177-1-177-35 (1976). 
99. In addition to the powers of the state to legislate in this area under its inherent 
police powers, the state has a mandate to enact a water code to provide comprehensive 
water management by virtue of a 1978 amendment to the state constitution that 
provides: 
Section 7. The State has an obligation to protect, control and 
regulate the use of Hawaii's water resources for the benefit of 
its people. 
The legislature shall provide for a water resources agency 
which, as provided by law, shall set overall water conservation, 
quality and use policies; define beneficial and reasonable uses; 
protect ground and surface water resources, watersheds and 
natural stream environments; establish criteria for water use 
priorities while assuring appurtenant rights and existing cor-
relative and riparian uses and establish procedures for regulat-
ing all uses of Hawaii's water resources. 
HAWAII CONST. art. XI, § 1-
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affirmed the state's power to regulate water and did not consti-
tute a transfer of the corpus of the water. 
At this point the litigation should have ended. The Ninth 
Circuit should have reversed the lower court and dissolved the 
injunction. Instead the Ninth Circuit ignored the certified an-
swers,100 and proceeded to find a federal constitutional violation. 
This is unfortunate since the McBryde decision, viewed in its 
least attractive light, simply did not decide the issues before the 
court. The Hawaii Supreme Court was asked to decide whether 
the trial court's allocation of waters among the parties was cor-
rect. The net effect of the original McBryde decision and the 
certified answers is that the state supreme court simply asserted 
that the state has a public trust over the waters and that there is 
never an absolute right to divert. Both statements are, in es-
sence, dicta and constitute a non-responsive answer to the ques-
tions presented. While such a result is a frustration of the judi-
cial process, particularly for litigants in a case which commenced 
in 1959, the actions of the court do not constitute a taking. 
The result in Robinson v. Ariyoshi is ironic. The Hawaii Su-
preme Court indicated that McBryde should be remanded to the 
trial court without clear instructions as to how to reallocate the 
waters. Despite the lengthy federal proceedings and dramatic as-
sertions of constitutional violations, this is also the net result of 
the Ninth Circuit decision. Subsequent to affirmance in the 
Ninth Circuit, the federal district court in Robinson v. Ariyoshi 
remanded the case to the state trial court to determine prescrip-
tive rights and allocate storm and freshet waters.lOl However, as 
100. The only mention that the Ninth Circuit makes of the certified questions is the 
following: 
The leisurely pace of this litigation has produced three oral 
arguments in this court, two of which were followed by referral 
of certified questions to the Supreme Court of Hawaii. [Cita-
tion omitted.] Following the publication of the state court's 
answers to the certified questions, the parties briefed the re-
maining issues that had been narrowed by the earlier proceed-
ings and reargued the case. 
753 F.2d at 1471. 
101. The federal district court retained jurisdiction over the case and remanded to 
the state trial court for a determination of prescriptive rights and an allocation of the 
storm and freshet waters: 
Unless determined by agreement of the parties in interest, the 
ultimate determination, to be made in the light of the deci-
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was the case subsequent to McBryde, the state trial court has no 
new legal basis upon which to allocate the waters. It was the 
same trial court's initial decision that was appealed to the Ha-
waii Supreme Court, in the form of the McBryde decision, which 
was again subsequently "appealed" to the federal district court, 
the Robinson decision. The federal court has now remanded the 
case to the state trial court. This act seems inappropriate given 
the normal rules regarding the relationship between state and 
federal courts. In effect, the state trial court has become the ap-
pellate court for its own decision. The federal court did not de-
clare any "state" substantive law by which the state court was to 
re-decide the case. Such an act would have been clearly beyond 
the powers of the federal court. Nor do the certified answers 
from the Hawaii Supreme Court, which are binding on the lower 
state courts, provide any rules upon which to allocate the water. 
Those certified answers that established the proper meaning of 
McBryde simply declared that the state has a public trust over 
the waters. 
There are three actions that create this ironic circumstance. 
The first is federal intervention in ongoing state proceedings 
that have not yet been completed. 1011 This prevents the state ju-
dicial process from having the opportunity to resolve the mean-
ing of McBryde in terms of specific allocation of the water. The 
second action is the Ninth Circuit's decision to ignore the an-
swers to the certified questions. loa Even assuming that courts 
sions rendered by this Court and the Ninth Circuit Court of 
Appeals, of the prescriptive water rights of McBryde Sugar 
Company, Limited, and of the allocation of storm and freshet 
surplus waters, is left to the Hawaii Fifth Circuit Court sitting 
as statutory water commissioner .... 
Amended Judgment After Remand at 7 and 8, Robinson v. Ariyoshi (Civ. No. 74-32) (D. 
Hawaii, Sept. 24, 1985). 
102. The federal court should abstain from such intervention. Trainor v. Hernandez, 
431 U.S. 434 (1977). 
103. Treating the answers from certified questions as non-binding will undermine 
the use of this technique. State supreme courts will have no interest in issuing opinions 
that will be ignored or construed against the wishes of the court. The decision of the 
Ninth Circuit to ignore the certified questions seems questionable in light of the princi-
ples of Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938) and against the spirit of the Full 
Faith and Credit Act, 28 U.S.C.A. § 1738 (1976). Within the Ninth Circuit, the Supreme 
Court of Washington deems its answers to certified questions as binding and non-
advisory: 
The case at bar illustrates clearly the needed and binding 
character of the decision of this court to the question certified. 
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can "take," the answers eliminated any possibility of a taking. 
The Ninth Circuit should have deemed the answers binding and 
reversed the judgment. The third action is the failure of the Ha-
waii Supreme Court to determine specifically how to allocate the 
water. The Hawaii Supreme Court, however, cannot be blamed 
in this matter since the federal courts intervened before the ac-
tion could be remanded to the state trial court. Moreover, the 
certified questions to the Hawaii Supreme Court from the Ninth 
Circuit did not specifically address this issue. Thus, the parties 
were caught between a federal court that should not have acted 
and a state court that did not act. 
In a very real sense Robinson is much ado about nothing. 
The McBryde decision did not change the status quo. Nonethe-
less, despite the fact that the sugar companies never could have . 
been harmed, the sugar companies may be awarded approxi-
mately four million dollars in attorney fees as the "prevailing" 
parties. It is difficult to understand how they "prevailed," since 
the perceived threat arose out of the wrong interpretation of the 
Hawaii Supreme Court's language as to "state ownership" of 
water. In a sense, the action in Robinson v. Ariyoshi was brought 
on the basis of the opposing parties stipulating to the wrong 
meaning of a judicial decision. The state should not be penalized 
by the award of attorneys fees to the plaintiffs simply because 
the plaintiffs successfully persuaded the district court to adopt 
an improper interpretation of McBryde. The rule of "no harm, 
no foul" should apply. Even assuming the waters could be 
owned, the threat of a taking of waters from the plaintiffs was 
never a conceptual, legal or political reality. 
D. No PROPERTY INTEREST IN JUDICIAL DECISIONS 
As stated, to reach the result in Robinson, it was necessary 
for the Ninth Circuit to construct false premises. First, as de-
scribed above, it was necessary for the court to assert that the 
The whole reason for invoking the certified question procedure 
is to obtain an authoritative meaning of RCW 48.410 so that 
the district court can apply that meaning in disposing of the 
bankruptcy proceeding pending before it. 
In re Elliot, 74 Wash.2d 600, 446 P.2d 347, 355 (1968). See also In re Richards, 223 A.2d 
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constitutionality of a judicial decision constitutes a separate 
cause of action from the underlying claim. Moreover, the court 
misinterpreted United States Supreme Court precedent as hold-
ing that the appellate decisions of a state supreme court can 
constitute "state action" for purposes of the fourteenth 
amendment. 
Finally, the Ninth Circuit assumed that judicial precedents 
can create property rights. This is a necessary step in any allega-
tion that an overruling decision has taken property. One must 
assume that the property taken was created by an earlier judi-
cial decision. 
There are three senses in which a judicial decision can as-
sertedly create property rights in various parties. First, there is 
the assertion that parties who did not participate in a judicial 
decision relied on the rules of law laid down by that judicial de-
cision. Arguably, if there is sufficient evidence of reliance, these 
parties may claim a property interest created by the rules. These 
assertions has been rejected. The United States Supreme Court 
has held that decisions do not create a property interest. lo", 
The second sense is that of res judicata. Parties to final 
judgments have strong rights not to have their judgments dis-
turbed, despite the fact that the original law under which the 
case was decided may have changed. 1011 
Finally, there is a third sense, as implied by the Ninth Cir-
cuit, that parties to a proceeding have a property interest in the 
general rules of law laid down by that decision. The difference 
between the second and third senses is that in the third sense 
104. Tidal Oil Co. v. Flanagan, 263 U.S. 444 (1924); Dunbar v. City of New York, 
251 U.S. 516 (1920); Patterson v. Colorado, 205 U.S. 454 (1907). Thus, as to McBryde 
Sugar Company, which was not related to a party in the Gay proceeding, it should not be 
able to claim a vested property right arising out of Gay or other cases. The Ninth Circuit 
held otherwise: 
The Robinson I court found that McBryde Sugar Company 
also relied upon the law set forth in Territory II and devel-
oped water rights that became vested. (Territorial cases are 
collected in Territory I, 31 Hawaii at 384). The extent of Mc-
Bryde's rights, however, the district court left for further liti-
gation in the state courts. [Citation omitted.) 
753 F.2d at 1474. 
105. Federated Dep't Store, Inc. v. Moitie, 452 U.S. 394 (1981). 
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the parties to a proceeding assertedly have a right to rely on the 
reasoning, as opposed to judgment, of a decision. In other words, 
the reasoning of a decision creates a vested right upon which the 
immediate parties may rely.lo6 
In Robinson, the Ninth Circuit held that by an earlier deci-
sion in Territory v. Gay,1°? the Supreme Court of the Territory 
of Hawaii determined that the owner of land upon which water 
arose essentially owned the surface water subject to minor rights 
of others for domestic use. That Territorial Supreme Court deci-
sion was affirmed by the Ninth Circuit. From this language, the 
106. Parties to a judgment may have a constitutional interest in the protection of 
the judgment in a res judicata sense. It is the judgment that creates the right. The Ninth 
Circuit's discussion indicates that it is the rules which create a vested property right for 
the immediate parties to the decision. Thus, the court does not give a legal ground by 
which to distinguish the vested rights of non-parties to a decision, such as McBryde 
Sugar Company, from parties, Gay and Robinson. Non-parties have no vested rights in 
decisions. See supra note 104. Parties do not have a vested right as to a decision, but 
may claim that their judgment is protected by the bar and merger principles of res judi-
cata. The Ninth Circuit's discussion should have been limited to whether Gay was res 
judicata as to the McBryde decision. Apparently, the parties did not think so since the 
parties to Gay participated willingly in the McBryde litigation and did not raise the res 
judicata issue. Hence, Gay and McBryde must be deemed as having presented two differ-
ent causes of action: Gay as to the right to divert and McBryde as to the allocation of 
the waters. The sugar companies would claim that the right to divert as determined in 
Gay was based on a rule of ownership of the waters and that this reasoning created 
vested rights that could not be disturbed in McBryde. The Hawaii Supreme Court in its 
answers to the certified questions however, stated that the oVirnership of these waters was 
not adjudicated in Gay because: 
Issues related to the definition or quantification of such nor-
mal daily surplus were not implicated because the parties stip-
ulated to the presence of such waters and left open the ques-
tion of the rights of others .... [TJhere was no ruling with 
respect to the rights of others upon which the very existence 
of surplus water was contingent. 
65 Hawaii at 670, 658 P.2d at 308. 
107. 31 Hawaii 356 (1931). The Ninth Circuit interpreted the effect of the Gay deci-
sion as follows: 
On April 28, 1930, the Supreme Court of the Territory of Ha-
waii, in litigation between substantially the same parties that 
are here today, except for the McBryde Sugar Company, held 
that the common law doctrine of riparian rights was not in 
force in Hawaii with reference to surplus waters of the normal 
flow of a stream. The same court further held that the owner 
(konohiki) of the land (iii) could use the water collected on his 
iii as he saw fit, subject to the rights of downstream owners to 
drinking water and other domestic uses that the parties in all 
this litigation have agreed have not been in controversy. 
753 F.2d at 1473. 
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Ninth Circuit asserted that the parties in Gay, substantially the 
same parties as those in Robinson, had a vested right to the 
rules laid down in Gay.l08 The Ninth Circuit went on to say that 
the Hawaii Supreme Court could overrule Gay, but the Mc-
Bryde decision could not divest these parties of their vested 
rights. McBryde could only prospectively effect water rights cre-
ated after it became fina1. 109 
The court is wrong on several counts. First, the United 
States Supreme Court has repeatedly held that the rules laid 
down in decisions to not create vested rights. 110 Second, the par-
ties in Gay have no more of a right to rely on the reasoning of 
Gay than do unrelated parties. The parties in Gay clearly have a 
right to a preservation of the judgment in Gay. A judgment, 
however, must be distinguished from the rules creating the judg-
ment. Parties to a proceeding as well as non-parties have no 
claim that the particular rules of any decision create vested 
rights. 
Moreover, it was improper for the Ninth Circuit to claim 
that Gay stands for the rule that parties who owned the land on 
which the surface waters arose controlled that water. The issue 
of quantification or normal surplus water was not implicated be-
cause the parties stipulated to the presence of such waters. A 
divided court held that the waters belonged to the konohiki.111 
As to storm and freshet surplus waters, Chief Justice Perry 
would have included such waters in normal daily surplus, but he 
was unable to convince a majority of the court.ll2 Thus even if it 
108. 753 F.2d 3t 1473-74. 
109. The Ninth Circuit stated: 
This declaration of a change in the water law of Hawaii may 
be effective with respect to real property rights created in Ha-
waii after the McBryde [decision became final. New law, how-
ever, cannot divest rights that were vested before the court 
announced the new law. See Hughes, 398 U.S. at 295-98, 88 
S.Ct. at 441-43. 
753 F.2d at 1474. 
110. See cases cited supra note 104. The Supreme Court has also held that state 
supreme courts may constitutionally overrule earlier decisions with either retroactive or 
prospective effect. Great Northern Ry. Co. v. Sunburst Oil and Refining Co., 287 U.S. 
358 (1932). This is further argument for the constitutionality of the result in McBryde. 
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were true that the reasoning of a judicial decision could create a 
vested right, there was no clear rule from which to infer such 
rights in Gay. 
Finally, the Ninth Circuit's statement that McBryde could 
only have prospective effect makes no sense at al1.1l3 Questions 
of property law like questions of title operate retroactively by 
their very nature. When the court in McBryde interpreted an 
earlier statute as requiring the application of riparian law, the 
change in law must refer back to the date of the enactment of a 
statute. The ostensible purpose of statutory interpretation is to 
ascertain original legislative intent.1l4 When a court rules that 
earlier interpretations of that original intent were wrong, the 
new meaning is deemed to speak as of the date of the enactment 
of the statute, not the date of the new overruling decision. Oth-
erwise, the statute cannot be considered as the basis for the 
change in law. lUi 
One might believe that the Ninth Circuit ruled that Mc-
Bryde must be treated as prospective since such prospectivity 
might mitigate the harshness of the Hawaii Supreme Court's 
ruling. Prospective application makes little sense when one at-
tempts to determine the corpus of waters and land to which 
such a new prospective ruling apply. No new land or rivers are 
being created in HawaiL116 In this sense, the rules of property, 
113. See supra note 109. 
114. Professor Dickerson has stressed the importance of legislative intent as follows: 
One of the most fundamental, and at the same time elu-
sive, concepts in the interpretation and application of statutes 
is that of legislative intent. 
The appeal of the concept is strong. In the division of re-
sponsibilities represented by the constitutional separation of 
powers, the legislature calls the main policy turns and the 
courts must respect its pronouncements. In such a relation-
ship, it would seem clear that so far as the legislature has ex-
pressed itself by statute the courts should try to determine as 
accurately as possible what the legislature intended to be 
done. 
R. DICKERSON, THE INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF STATUTES, 67 (1975). 
115. If a statute is deemed to have a different "original" meaning as of the date of 
the judicial decision which effectuated the change, then it must be the judge and not the 
statute that is imparting the new meaning. 
116. But see Hawaii v. Zimring, 58 Hawaii 106, 556 P.2d 725 (1977) (the state is the 
owner of newly created volcanic lands). This final judgment in Zimring was collaterally 
attacked in federal district court in Hawaii as a taking of property much like the action 
in Robinson v. Ariyoshi. The federal district court dismissed on the grounds that it 
33
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unlike the rules of procedure or torts, are, by logical necessity, 
retroactive. 
The Ninth Circuit might have meant that McBryde could 
operate only prospectively as a matter of logic. If so, the taking 
claim is undermined. If the decision could only operate prospec-
tively as a matter of logic then it was not possible for it to have 
had effect on the sugar companies. If this is the proper gloss to 
be given McBryde then the taking claim must vanish and with it 
the claim for attorneys fees. 
The purpose of this doctrinal pathology has been to demon-
strate the invalidity of the three assumptions made by the fed-
eral courts in Robinson: 1) that judicial decisions create vested 
rights; 2) that appellate decisionmaking may constitute "state 
action" that takes property; and 3) that the constitutionality of 
a decision is a new cause of action different from the underlying 
claim. By combining these false premises the federal courts in 
Robinson were able to sidestep the Rooker doctrine, res judicata, 
ripeness and sovereignty. These three false premises, however, 
give rise to a bizarre, judicial world where the normal relation-
ship between finality and validity are reversed. In the world of 
Robinson v. Ariyoshi, ultimate finality in the system is de-
stroyed in the quest for absolute truth, as if such a truth existed. 
As a case concerning Hawaiian water rights, Robinson pro-
vides no guidance. In federalism terms, however, it must be 
taken very seriously as a case allowing the federal district courts 
to set aside final state judgments on the grounds that a decision 
lacked jurisdiction: 
In resolving this question, plaintiffs' characterization of their 
complaint and its form cannot prevail over the substance of 
their action." [citations omitted.) The relief sought by plain-
tiffs-a declaration that the state has no interest in the lava 
extension and has taken the property without just compensa-
tion, an injunction compelling the State to convey the lava ex-
tension to the plaintiffs, or $350,OOO-is wholly dependent 
upon the question of title, already determined adversely to the 
plaintiffs. To grant such relief, this court clearly would have to 
directly review the Hawaiian Supreme Court's decision, reject 
its interpretation of Hawaiian property law, and essentially re-
verse its holding on title, and modify its judgment. [Citations 
omitted.) This process clearly constitutes the exercise of ap-
pellate jurisdiction. 
Zimring v. State of Hawaii, No. 79-0054, slip op. at 4-5, (D. Hawaii, filed June 25, 1979). 
34
Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 16, Iss. 1 [1986], Art. 11
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol16/iss1/11
1986] FEDERAL JURISDICTION 157 
took property. The next section addresses "The layman's view of 
a taking," the process by which the courts arrive at decisions 
such as Robinson, and the constitutionality of retroactive 
overruling. 
IV. THE LAYMAN'S VIEW OF A TAKING 
The reasoning in Robinson runs so strongly against the 
grain of the normal judicial impulse to treat final state judg-
ments as final, that the result must have been strongly moti-
vated by a view that it was the only just result. This sense of 
justice was probably predicated on a "layman's" concept of a 
taking, a concept noted elsewhere.l17 The layman's view of a tak-
ing is an "I know it when I see it" approach. Although, the logic 
of the judicial system may compel a different result, this ap-
proach discards rules in favor of an intuitive, experiential under-
standing of a taking. 
The Ninth Circuit's frequent reference to Justice Stewart's 
concurring opinion in Hughes u. Washington1l8 is evidence of its 
conversion to this approach. In Hughes, Justice Stewart had 
before him a problem similar to Robinson. Property that had 
existed under an earlier decision of the Washington Supreme 
Court was taken away by a later decision. His statement in that 
case has a common sense "lay" ring to it: 
[A] State cannot be permitted to defeat the con-
stitutional prohibition against taking property 
without due process of law by the simple device of 
asserting retroactively that the property it has 
taken never existed at all. Whether the decision 
117. As Professor Tribe has described it: 
Most people know a taking when they see one, or at least 
they think they do. Before the taking, an object or a piece of 
land belonged to X, who could use it in a large number of 
ways and who enjoyed legal protection in preventing others 
from doing things to it without X's permission. After the tak-
ing, X's relationship to the object or the land was fundamen-
tally transformed; he could no longer use it at all, and other 
people could invoke legal arguments and mechanisms to keep 
him away from it exactly as he had been able to invoke such 
arguments and mechanisms before the taking had occurred. 
L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 456 (1977) (citing B. ACKERMAN, PRIVATE 
PROPERTY AND THE CONSTITUTION 88-167 (1977)). 
118. 389 U.S. 290, 294-98 (Stewart, J., concurring). 
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here worked an unpredictable change in state law 
thus inevitably presents a federal question for the 
determination of this Court. . . .119 
The problem Justice Stewart posed was this: The Constitu-
tion provides that property cannot be taken without just com-
pensation' but nowhere does the Constitution define property. 
The definition of property is left to state courts which leads to 
the problem in Hughes and Robinson.120 The proper application 
of the fifth amendment could be manipulated by courts that ret-
roactively change the rules of property, or, in the case posed in 
Hughes, assert that a particular interest was never property. 
In a sense, a paradox is created. Property is defined as those 
interests deemed to be property by the state courts. At the same 
time, the federal courts assert that some interests are inherently 
"property," regardless of the definition state courts apply. The 
paradox is similar to a person who asserts that all bachelors are 
men (because that is how "bachelor" is defined) but also claims 
that it is also true as a matter of experience that some bachelors 
are not men. In other words, logic commands one result, but our 
experience dictates another. Take, for example, the following 
paradox, called the "Class A Blackout": 
The military commander of a certain camp 
announces on a Saturday evening that during the 
following week there will be a "Class A Blackout." 
The date and time of the exercise are not pre-
scribed because a "Class A Blackout" is defined 
as an exercise which the participants cannot know 
is going to take place prior to 6:00 P.M. on the 
evening in which it occurs. It is easy to see that it 
follows from the announcement of this definition 
119. Id. at 296-97. 
120. In Roth, the Supreme Court stated that property interests are created by the 
state: 
Property interests, of course are not created by the Constitu-
tion. Rather they are created and their dimensions are defined 
by existing rules or understandings that stem from an inde-
pendent source such as state law-rules or understandings 
that secure certain benefits and that support claims of entitle-
ment to those benefits. 
Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972). 
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that the exercise cannot take place at all. It can-
not take place on Saturday because if it has not 
occurred on one of the first six days of the week it 
must occur on the last. And the fact that the par-
ticipants can know this violated the condition 
which defines it. Similarly, because it cannot take 
place on Saturday, it cannot take place on Friday, 
either, because when Saturday is eliminated Fri-
day is the last available day and is, therefore, in-
validated for the same reason as Saturday. And 
by similar arguments Thursday, Wednesday, etc. 
back to Sunday are eliminated in turn, so that the 
exercise cannot take place at all.!2! 
159 
The above illustration is a paradox because experience tells 
us, that despite the logic, it is nonetheless possible to be sur-
prised. In fact, one may be so totally convinced that one could 
experience a surprise blackout that one may assert that the logic 
of the paradox is wrong. This is akin to the thrust of Justice 
Stewart's assertion-regardless of the logic of a "taking," which 
cannot by definition be occurring, he is sure that a taking has 
occurred. 
However, experience can often be misleading. The Ninth 
Circuit in Robinson, and Justice Stewart in Hughes, may "expe-
rience" a taking since the result in McBryde resembles other 
takings committed by the legislative or the executive branch. 
However, the judiciary is different from the other two branches 
of government. If courts were deemed to take, they would cease 
to be courts. This is the point of the next section. 
V. CHANGE AND DUE PROCESS: THE MYTH 
Cases involving change in the law, as in McBryde v. Robin-
son, are a true embarrassment to the legal philosopher. In Eng-
land, it was not until the last two decades that the House of 
Lords admitted that decisions could be overruled.122 In the 
United States, occasional overruling has been deemed necessary 
but the theoretical explanation, couched in Blackstonian terms, 
121. P. HUGHES AND G. BRECHT, VICIOUS CIRCLES AND INFINITY: AN ANTHOLOGY OF 
PARADOXES, 35-36 (1975). 
122. R. CROSS, PRECEDENT IN ENGLISH LAW 109-13 (3d ed. 1977). 
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has always seemed oddly simplistic.123 The Blackstonian theory 
of appellate decision preserved at all costs the view that judges 
"declared" and did not "make" the law. l24 In Holmes' sarcastic 
phrase, the law was a "brooding omnipresence in the sky. "1211 
The judge consulted this presence and recorded what he discov-
ered. If a later judge applied a different version of the law, it was 
explained on the basis that he had a clearer vision than the ear-
lier judge. What each judge saw and recorded was not the law 
itself but only evidence of the law-much as tracks in a cloud 
chamber are not the sub-atomic particles themselves, but only 
evidence of the particles. Thus, one could never know the real 
law with finality.126 Later judges, equipped with better social 
and historical vision, were able to "discover" a more accurate 
version of the law. Thus, in the McBryde decision, the Hawaii 
Supreme Court in 1974 purported to discover a new understand-
ing of mid-nineteenth century statutes which explained that the 
king never intended to part with sovereignty over the water.127 
The notion of "discovering" the true law is an admitted fic-
tion.128 The purpose of the fiction is to allow courts to engage in 
judicial legislation to create a more just or honest result. When 
courts change the law, they act like legislative bodies.129 Legisla-
123. See Levy, Realist Jurisprudence and Prospective Overruling, 109 U. PA. L. 
REV. I, 2 (1960). 
124. [d. 
125. [d. 
126. As Professor Levy would state: 
The judge merely finds the preexisting law; he then merely 
declares what he finds. A prior judicial decision is not the law 
itself but only evidence of what the law is. Thus a later judi-
cial decision which seems to change the law has not really 
changed it at all but has only discovered the "true" rule which 
was always the law. 
[d. at 2. (emphasis in original). Thus, there is no possibility of arriving at the true law as 
a matter of absolute finality. 
127. 54 Hawaii at 184-87, 504 P.2d at 1337-39. 
128. Professor Fuller explained this notion as follows: "The general fiction of Anglo-
American jurisprudence that courts do not 'make' law but only 'discover' or 'declare' it 
has been the cause of innumerable special fictions designed to conceal the process of 
legislation that goes on in the courts." L. FULLER, LEGAL FICTIONS 88 (1967). 
129. Professor Leach points this out: 
On the one hand, the Law Lords, when deciding a case, "find" 
the law, and announce their finding. But on the other, when 
they overrule themselves they are legislating, which is the pre-
rogative of the two houses of the Parliament subject to the 
Royal assent. And this last is unconstitutional. 
Leach, Revisionism in the House of Lords: The Bastion of Rigid Stare Decisis Falls, 80 
HARV. L. REV. 791, 800 (1967). 
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tive bodies resolve issues on the basis of "what's best" for soci-
ety. The Blackstonian fiction dictates that courts follow the 
commands of the "law" or "what's true." 
" 
Thus, when courts act as a legislative body and do so in a 
way that has severe economic consequences to parties relying on 
earlier precedent, critics argue that the courts should be subject 
to the just compensation clause. In other words when courts leg-
islate, they should be treated like the legislature. 
The error in such thinking is that the judicial system rests 
upon a fiction that courts declare rather than create the law. To 
admit that courts create law and to allow their decisions to be 
collaterally attacked as in Robinson would undermine the most 
important function of the judicial system-the ability to resolve 
disputes with finality. 
Hence, once the Supreme Court had denied review in Mc-
Bryde v. Robinson, the decision was final, the "system had spo-
ken."13o To allow a federal district court or a state trial court to 
set aside that final judgment on the grounds that it was an "un-
expected change"131 in the law, creates the possibility that every 
final decision, even that of the Ninth Circuit in Robinson v. 
Ariyoshi, could be collaterally attacked in a trial court. The im-
portance of finality need not be restated here. Nor is there need 
to emphasize the dangers of stale challenges to final decrees.132 
130. See supra note 47. The phrase "system had spoken" is taken from the follow-
ing Note: 
The most obvious candidate to serve as the system's signal 
that is has spoken with finality is, of course, the final judg-
ment. For the final judgment to be effective as the system's 
signal it is necessary that the judgment speak not merely for 
the court entering it but for the system as a whole. . . . 
Presumably, no one would disagree with the proposition 
that a final judgment rendered by the United States Supreme 
Court is valid and is the system's last word, no matter how 
"wrong" it may appear .... Moreover, for questions admitted 
to be solely of state law, the same may be said for decisions of 
state courts of last resort. They, too, speak for the system. [Ci-
tations omitted.] 
Note, Filling the Void: Judicial Power and Jurisdictional Attacks on Judgments, 87 
YALE L. J. 164, 189-90 (1977). 
131. Justice Stewart used the phrase "unpredicted change" in Hughes v. Washing-
ton, 389 U.S. at 297 (1967) (Stewart, J., concurring). 
132. The time limitations on review to the U.S. Supreme Court are designed to 
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Even if final decisions may, in some sense, be "wrong" the need 
for finality is so commanding in any dispute resolution system 
that collateral attacks must be discouraged. 
The justification for delaying finality, as in Robinson, rests 
with the hope that further proceedings will produce "the 
truth."133 When interests like liberty are at stake, the American 
judicial system does suspend finality to a great degree in the va-
rious form of post-conviction relief. 134 But, in both the cases of 
criminal proceedings and determinations of the water law of a 
particular state, suspensions of finality for some more accurate 
determination of truth depend on the dubious assumption that 
the ultimate truth is knowable. 131i In the case of criminal law, the 
"ultimate truth" may appear if a key prosecution witness re-
cants years after a wrongful conviction. The "ultimate truth" is 
much less clear when a federal district court second guesses a 
state supreme court on the issue of that state's water law. 
One may argue that preservation of the fiction that judges 
declare the law hardly seems the basis to justify depriving par-
ties of vested rights. But, the real fiction is that of our concept 
of law itself-that it is an unchanging body of rules capable of 
clear interpretation. Our willingness to be bound by the rule of 
law rests upon the fiction that law is objective. Moreover, much 
of the moral authority of the law lies in our belief that the gov-
erning rule preexisted the particular dispute to be decided even 
if the court overrules earlier decisions to reach the proper result. 
In this sense the law can be allegedly trusted as neutral and the 
result seen as commanded by the law and not the whim of the 
judge. There are societal benefits in a system that is based on 
shorten the uncertainty associated with incomplete proceedings, and encourage resolu-
tion when witnesses are still fresh and evidence preserved. 
133. One reason for the need for finality in judicial systems is that human beings do 
have awareness of the ultimate truth. Note, Filling the Void: Judicial Power and Juris-
dictional Attacks on Judgments, 87 Yale L. J. 164, 187 (1977). 
134. See, e.g., Korematsu v. United States, 584 F. Supp. 1406 (N.D. Cal. 1984) 
(granting petition for writ of coram nobis to an American citizen interned in a relocation 
camp during World War 11). 
135. Once procedural fairness is established final decisions should have preclusive 
effect on later proceedings seeking to reopen them: "But once it has been determined 
that due process was satisfied, further inquiry is meaningless. Such an inquiry would be 
an attempt to ascertain the 'Facts as They Really Are,' an attempt that cannot succeed." 
Note, Filling the Void: Judicial Power and Jurisdictional Attacks on Judgments, 87 
YALE L.J. 164, 188 (1977). 
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the rule of law. When law changes, the rule of law may appear 
more clearly as a legal fiction. Yet, in these cases it is even more 
important to employ the fiction and at least speak as if the gov-
erning law preexisted the particular dispute. Perhaps we are 
fooling ourselves when we claim that we are ruled by law and 
not men, but, if we did not so fool ourselves, it would be difficult 
to distinguish the decisionmaking process of courts from legisla-
tive bodies. If courts cannot be distinguished from the legislative 
branch, the finality and deference accorded judicial decisions 
would be difficult to defend. After all, if court decisions are 
openly based on policy considerations, they would be less au-
thoritative, since policymaking is usually the province of the 
legislature.136 
The fiction that judges declare law also allows us to recon-
cile paradoxical notions about law-that law is stable yet capa-
ble of change. To complain when law changes or when judges 
apply discretion is simply not to understand the concept of 
rules. The concept of rules should be seen as a duality: it is 
binding and ultimately not binding at the same time.137 In the 
long run, the master rule of law is not stability, it is change. In 
many areas of the law parties are deemed to have implicit notice 
as to the possibility of change. For example, corporations may be 
subject to later, different laws whether or not the corporation 
had incorporated prior to the change. Rights in the rules of cor-
poration law do not vest. Corporation statutes explicitly or im-
plicitly provide that parties are on notice that the rules may 
change.138 It is difficult to see why this should not apply in the 
case of water rights as well. Financial investments made on the 
basis of the corporation laws may be just as weighty as those 
made in reliance on property rules. 
Over the long run, it is society that changes. Rules that did 
not change as a society changes could not be deemed the same 
rule. A rule and a society in which that rule exists are like the 
136. See Chang, Unraveling Robinson, supra note 8, at 74-78. 
137. As Judge Edward D. Re stated: "If the doctrine of precedents is regarded as 
the champion of stability and uniformity in law, it must, nevertheless, give way to pro-
gress, the needs of society in a subsequent era and the overwhelming considerations of 
equity and justice." E. RE, BRIEF WRITING AND ORAL ARGUMENT 92 (4th ed. 1974). 
138. Such "savings clauses" have become common since Justice Story's comment in 
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foreground and the background of a painting. It is the overall 
picture which must be evaluated. If the foreground changes and 
the background remains the same, then the picture has changed. 
If the foreground remains the same and the background changes 
then, again, the picture has changed. A rule must not be viewed 
as merely the words in a judicial decision or a statute. Rather, a 
rule must be understood in terms of the concrete results it com-
mands upon the life of a society. If society changes, the effects a 
rule has on society also changes. Hence, if the background has 
fundamentally changed, the rule too, has changed. 
VI. CONCLUSION: WHEN THE BACKGROUND CHANGES 
In Hawaii, the societal background to the rules regarding 
water rights had completely changed by the time of the Mc-
Bryde decision. The rules that supposedly decreed private own-
ership of water were primarily set out by the Territorial Su-
preme Court of Hawaii. These rules were not faithful to the way 
Native Hawaiians managed water prior to the coming of the 
westerners, a point made by the Hawaii Supreme Court in Rep-
pum v. Board of Water Supply.139 Rather, the Native Hawaiians 
exercised water rights in a communal manner. The Konohiki 
was an agent of the King. He did not "own" the water, as later 
post-annexation, Territorial precedents may have suggested.140 
Rather, the Konohiki oversaw the allocation, management and 
regulation of water among the taro farmers. Since the King held 
sovereignty over the waters, similar to the present notion of the 
public trust, the Konohiki, as an agent of the King did not re-
quire ownership of the surface water to perform his task.141 
139. 65 Hawaii 531, 547-48, 656 P.2d 57, 68-69 (1982) cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 2016 
(1985). 
140. In Reppun, the Hawaii Supreme Court stated: 
However, the creation of private and exclusive interests in 
water, within a context of western concepts regarding prop-
erty, compelled the drawing of fixed lines of authority and in-
terests which were not consonant with Hawaiian custom. 
Thus, the distinction drawn between "rights" and "sup-
plies by permission" or "favors" in Horner, while making per-
fect sense within the western understanding of "property," 
would make no sense at all under the ancient system of 
allocation. 
rd. at 547, 656 P.2d at 68. 
141. rd. 
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Ownership of the surface waters was a concept that was use-
ful to the sugar industry. That industry needed to acquire relia-
ble sources of water. The ancient system of reciprocal rights and 
duties at the heart of Native Hawaiian water practice could not 
form the basis for the firm water contracts necessary for the de-
velopment of the sugar industry. After annexation, Hawaii be-
came a territory of the United States. The President appointed 
the governor of Hawaii. The governor appointed the justices of 
the Hawaii Supreme Court. Since many of the justices of the 
Territorial Supreme Court were not a product of direct local po-
litical participation, coming instead from law firms that served 
the sugar interests, the notion of private ownership of the sur-
face water was never judicially challenged. 
Statehood brought major political changes to Hawaii. From 
the perspective of local residents the political reasons for state-
hood were clear. The citizens of Hawaii held a second class 1Y0lit-
ical status, having no electoral influence on their governor or the 
judiciary. They could not even vote for President of the United 
States.142 Thus, along with the desire for a popularly elected 
governor, one of the political motivations behind the move for 
statehood was development of a judiciary more directly repre-
sentative of the population. This is a right held by the citizens of 
every state. 
Thus, statehood promised to bring change to the racial 
makeup and philosophical outlook of the state bench. Given the 
fact that a majority of Hawaii's citizens were not white, a popu-
larly elected governor would have appointed a judiciary of un-
doubtedly different color and temperament than had existed in 
Territorial days. 143 
The decision to grant statehood to Hawaii was brought 
about through the formal constitutional processes: the approval 
of Congress, the President and the people of Hawaii. The ex-
142. Robinson v. Ariyoshi, 65 Hawaii, 641, 667 n.25, 658 P.2d 287, 306 n.25 (1982) 
(Answers to Certified Questions). 
143. At the time of statehood, a majority of Hawaii's population was non-white. In 
1960, of the total population of 632,772 in the State of Hawaii, 202,230 were counted as 
Caucasian, defined to include Puerto Ricans, Portugese, Spanish and other Caucasians. 
Caucasians have never constituted a majority of the population of Hawaii. R. SCHMIT!', 
HISTORICAL STATISTICS OF HAWAII 25 (1977). 
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pected change in the nature of the judiciary did occur.·44 With 
different people wearing the robes of judges and justice, there 
was no question that a different type of jurisprudence would 
evolve. Indeed, this has happened with statehood: the back-
ground of Hawaii had changed. 
McBryde v. Robinson was the first water rights case to ap-
pear before the Hawaii Supreme Court. As such, the changes 
wrought by McBryde cannot be deemed unexpected. Like the 
land reforms that occurred in the legislature,145 jurisprudential 
change should have been clearly forseen by the act of statehood. 
To have expected the judicial decisions of the Hawaii Su-
preme Court to simply reaffirm earlier precedents of another po-
litical era would have been unrealistic. It would be similar to 
expecting the first United States Supreme Court to blindly fol-
low the precedents of the English law, or to expect that a new 
Supreme Court appointed in the aftermath of the election of 
President Aquino of the Phillipines, would be required by the 
rules of stare decisis to uphold all the precedents of the prior 
Court, appointed by former President Marcos. 
The Hawaii Supreme Court pointed out in a footnote this 
justification for the evolution of state law expressed by Mc-
Bryde.146 The court did not disavow all precedent prior to state-
hood. Rather, it suggested that the affirmative decision on state-
hood by all concerned was an agreement and recognition that 
political self-determination should apply to Hawaii. 
Finally, it is not only the political structure of Hawaii that 
has changed since the days of the Territory. The environmental 
situation in Hawaii is vastly different from the days when water 
was viewed as privately owned. Hawaii's population has grown 
tremendously, straining water resources. In the years following 
McBryde, there were water shortages, the implementation of 
emergency groundwater control measures··' and the passage of a 
144. Presently, a majority (57 out of 78) of the judges and justices in the state judi-
ciary are non-white. The Judiciary, State of Hawaii, ANNUAL REPORT (December 31, 
1985). 
145. See, e.g., Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff, 104 S. Ct. 2321, (1984) (uphold-
ing constitutionality of a state law providing for redistribution of fee simple land). 
146. See supra note 142. 
147. In November of 1979, the Hawaii State Board of Land and Natural Resources 
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state constitutional amendment requiring control and protection 
of water through a state water code.Hs 
Moreover, sugar is not the industry it once was. Tourism 
has replaced it as the premier private sector industry. Sugar sur-
vives on the basis of federal price supports and thus has fallen 
from its status as the state's dominant industry to become an 
industry dependent on price supports and import quotas. Given 
the hostility of the Reagan administration to continued price 
supports, sugar industry officials predict the eventual demise of 
the industry.I49 In light of the precarious future of sugar in Ha-
waii, the tenacious desire of the industry to retain private own-
ership of water may be a means of retaining control of water for 
land development when sugar lands eventually go out to 
production. 
Thus, as in the political arena, the demographic and eco-
nomic background has changed since the time sugar was king. 
Water, once plentiful, is growing scarce. Given the greater and 
greater competition for water, public regulation and manage-
ment becomes more and more sensible. The former private mar-
ket system of buying and selling water, premised on private 
ownership of water, is no longer appropriate. Water is too criti-
cal a resource to be left to market forces where one can only 
hope that the laws of supply and demand will result in policy 
that serves the whole community. Hawaii and its self-renewing 
water supply system can be analogized to a spaceship travelling 
on a journey that will take many generations. There are a lim-
ited supply of goods on board and a finite quantity of renewable 
resources such as food and water. Which system of allocation 
would work best: a system where resources are collectively 
pooled and distributed according to need or a system based on 
private ownership of water where those who started with the re-
sources or money are allowed to hoard resources the the depriva-
tion of others? 
adopted regulations for the management of groundwater extraction under Chapter 177 of 
the Hawaii Revised Statutes (1976). The board proposed designation of the Pearl Harbor 
Basin for regulation under the statute. Since that time the Board has designated other 
areas on Oahu. 
148. HAWAII CONST. art. XI § 7. See supra note 99. 
149. E.g., End sugar industry quickly, suggests former head of C & C, Honolulu 
Advertiser, July 13, 1985, at A-2, col. 3. 
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It is within this context of political, environmental and eco-
nomic change that one must evaluate the rule of private owner-
ship. Such a rule has a completely different impact on a society 
that has an endless supply of water than on a society where 
there is scarcity. When a situation changes so dramatically, as in 
the case of Hawaii, the rules of allocation must be deemed to 
have changed as well. Hence, there is no logical basis to the as-
sertion in Robinson that federal courts have a right to force 
state courts to continue the existence of inappropriate rules of 
law. 
In conclusion, there are a variety of reasons why only the 
United States Supreme Court should have the power to judge 
the constitutionality of state decisions. Some of these reasons fo-
cus on the history of distrust between the states and the federal 
government. 1l10 Other reasons, as pointed out in this article, are 
concerns of the judicial system as a dispute resolution process. 
There must be a logical end where the system must be deemed 
to have spoken with finality.m Finally, as pointed out in the 
above section, rules change because society changes.1112 Indeed, 
150. See D. Currie, The Three·Judge Court in Constitutional Litigation, 32 U. CHI. 
L. REV. 1 (1964) (discussing state resistance to review of state decisions by the Supreme 
Court). 
151. The problems of lack of finality are self-evident: 
If there are two "final" answers to a dispute, then neither may 
be relied upon until the dispute between the answers has been 
resolved. The most obvious candidate to serve as the system's 
signal that it has spoken with finality is, of course, the final 
judgment. For the final judgment to be effective as the sys-
tem's signal it is necessary that the judgment speak not 
merely for the court entering it but for the system as a whole. 
Note, Filling the Void: Judicial Power and Jurisdictional Attacks on Judgments, 87 
YALE L. J. 164, 189 (1977). 
152. This point has been made frequently: 
With social change comes the imperative demand that law 
shall satisfy the needs which change has created, and so the 
problem, above all others, of jurisprudence in the modern 
world is the reconciliation of the demands, paradoxical and to 
some extent conflicting, that law shall at once have continuity 
with the past and adaptability to the present and the future. 
Stone, The Common Law in the United States, 50 HARV. L. REV. 4, 11 (1936). 
This author has also spoken similarly in another context: 
In Hawaii, one cannot expect the property law of Old England 
to make sense today. Nineteenth century English law focused 
on the paradigm of "Blackacre," a 25 acre (lO-ha) estate with 
running streams, gardens, and a 20 room mansion. With 
Blackacre as model, property law developed in a certain way. 
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in the long run, the master rule is change. To view law as un-
changing is to view law in isolation from its impact on society. 
To enforce consistency in law, as the Ninth Circuit has at-
tempted in Robinson, results in enforcement of inappropriate 
rules. The intrusiveness of the result in Robinson emphasizes 
the importance of state sovereignty in areas of traditional state 
concern. HiS As the Ninth Circuit's reliance on the importance of 
protecting its own ruling in Gay may attest/Ii. the Ninth Circuit 
once was the highest court of the Territory of Hawaii.lIiIi Those 
colonial days, however, are long gone. The supreme court of the 
state of Hawaii should be given the same deference and sover-
eignty intended all state supreme courts under the Constitution. 
There may be instances when federal intervention in state court 
proceedings is necessary to protect constitutional rights, but in 
this case, the Ninth Circuit missed the boat. 
On the other hand, the paradigm of Blackacre for Hawaii is 
likely to be a two-bedroom condominium in a 20 story build-
ing with 1000 residents on 3.5 acres (1.4 ha). Given the radical 
difference between these two paradigms, it is not surprising 
that prior rules are sometimes overruled. 
Chang, Water Rights in an Age of Anxiety, 77 J. AM. WATER WORKS A. 40, 43 (1985). 
153. See, e.g., Brinkerhoff-Faris Trust & Savings Co.v. Hill, 281 U.S. 673, 680 
(1930). 
154. 753 F.2d at 1473-74. 
155. During territorial days, the Ninth Circuit was the highest court of the Territory 
of Hawaii in civil cases where the amount in controversy exceeded $5000. Thus, the 
Ninth Circuit was the "supreme court" of the Territory of most civil matters. See, e.g., 
Kimbrel v. Territory, 41 F.2d 740 (9th Cir. 1930). 
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